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SOFT POWER, STRATEGIC SECURITY,
AND INTERNATIONAL PHILANTHROPY
GARRY W. JENKINS*
This Article examines a variety of regulatory rules, administrative
responses, and legislative actions designed to prevent nonprofit
organizations from unwittingly providing support to terrorist
groups around the world. A combination of federal executive
orders, legislation, and administrative guidelines is intended to
enhance U.S. security interests, protect American charities from
abuse, and ultimately keep U.S. citizens safe by stemming the flow
of funds to terrorists. Although these may be laudable goals, the
government's approach may actually have the effect of undermining
U.S. security interests by inadvertently chilling the flow of charitable
dollars overseas to address serious problems, including those
associated with the root causes of terrorism, such as extreme
poverty, inadequate access to health care, stalled economic
development, and poor education systems. The central argument of
this Article is that burdens placed on international philanthropy
exact more than merely administrative costs from U.S. grantmakers;
they also exact security costs affecting U.S. interests that have been
underappreciated by policymakers. Specifically, overseas
grantmaking serves as an ally in the war against terrorism by
contributing to public diplomacy efforts supporting a positive image
of the United States abroad through international humanitarian
relief activities, and by generating U.S. "soft power" used to garner
multilateral cooperation in foreign affairs. Only by recognizing
and acknowledging international philanthropy's tangible
contributions to the national security agenda will the federal
government begin to shift its current regulatory approach to
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overseas grantmaking from focusing exclusively on conceivable
charitable abuses by terrorists to a more balanced and strategic
response. U.S. policy should address legitimate and well-founded
concerns about terrorist financing while simultaneously ensuring
and even encouraging U.S. charities' and private foundations'
continued engagement in international programs and giving.
International charity should not become a victim of the global fight
against terrorism but should be treated as a front-line ally.
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INTRODUCTION
More than five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and
three years after the release of The 9/11 Commission Report,' the
United States is still engaged in a process of debating, considering,
and now reconsidering strategies, approaches, and policies to
effectively address the challenges of global terrorism. As we further
understand the long-term nature of this struggle, we appreciate the
constant need to develop new and strengthen existing relationships
with allies, better utilize strategic advantages, and undertake sound
policymaking to promote the short-term and long-term interests of
U.S. citizens with respect to national security. Accordingly, current
U.S. policy toward international grantmaking by private, independent
charitable organizations warrants serious reconsideration.
The United States has long embraced a tradition of
philanthropy.2 American charitable organizations are responsible for
a range of innovations that have improved humankind and aided
1. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT].
2. Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville on public associations in American civil life:
Americans of all ages, conditions, and all dispositions constantly unite together.
Not only do they have commercial and industrial associations to which all belong
but also a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and
very specialized, large and small.... I have frequently admired the endless skill
with which the inhabitants of the United States manage to set a common aim to
the efforts of a great number of men and to persuade them to pursue it voluntarily.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 596 (Gerald E. Bevan trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1835); see Peter D. Hall, The Welfare State and the Careers of Public
and Private Institutions Since 1945, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 363, 363-64 (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds.,
2003) (noting the growth in the number of nonprofit organizations in the United States:
12,000 in 1940, 50,000 in 1950, 300,000 in 1960, 600,000 in the mid-1970s, and 1,500,000 by
2003). See generally CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra (describing the history of American philanthropy and its importance in American
society); Lester M. Salamon, The United States, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 280,280-88 (Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier eds.,
1997) (providing a general history of the development of the nonprofit sector in the
United States).
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people outside of the United States.3 Although most of the activity of
U.S.-based private foundations and public charities has been focused
on domestic concerns, international affairs and cross-border
initiatives play a pivotal role in America's philanthropic activities.4
For example, generous Americans often respond to humanitarian
crises all over the world, 5 and a range of U.S.-based organizations
carry out programs and provide charitable support in all corners of
the globe. For some nonprofit organizations, involvement in cross-
border philanthropy is an integral component of their charitable and
strategic mission.6
3. For example, in the 1960s, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation
were instrumental in creating research centers to develop improved production methods
for wheat and rice. Two of the centers, the International Rice Research Institute in the
Philippines and the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico,
created new varieties of rice and wheat that greatly enhance crop yields, allowing
developing populations to produce enough food to provide for their growing populations
and prevent a world hunger crisis. See David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The
International Legal Regime for Plant Resources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 373, 389-92
(1998). Cures for several global diseases have been discovered due to the work of
nonprofit organizations and the support of private foundations. See, e.g., John G. Simon,
Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 246, 254 (Susan Rose-Ackerman
ed., 1986) (attributing Jonas Salk's discovery of the polio vaccine to a $15,000 gift from the
Sarah Scaife Foundation); Sabin Russell, S.F Nonprofit Helps Develop Low-Cost Cure for
Black Fever, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2004, at A6 (discussing the efforts of a nonprofit
organization to provide a cure for black fever, which kills 200,000 people a year in poor
countries, second only to malaria). Currently, U.S. funders are tackling equally vexing
problems around the world, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's initiatives
on infectious diseases and the Open Society Institute's extensive efforts to bring civil
society to formerly authoritarian regimes. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 6-10 (2005); Peter Baker, Soros's Mission in Russia Ends, $1 Billion
Later, WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, at A14; David Holley, Soros Invests in His Democratic
Passion, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at A6; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Millions of Lives on the
Line in Malaria Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at F6; Ian Wilhelm, A View Inside the
Gates, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 11, 2004, at 12.
4. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA: 2004, at 11, 44 (2004)
(reporting that international affairs organizations, including U.S. intermediaries, received
an estimated $5.3 billion in contributions in 2003, a growth of 14.8% from the previous
year).
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Nearly Triples Tsunami Aid Pledge, to $950
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A3 ("Americans have given $700 million to charities
for the relief effort."); Stevenson Swanson, Tsunami Aid Pledges Turn into Cash, CHI.
TRIB., June 26, 2005, at C9 (reporting that Americans have donated an estimated $1.4
billion toward tsunami relief efforts).
6. See, e.g., THE FORD FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2005) ("The Ford
Foundation is a resource for innovative people and institutions worldwide. Our goals are
to: strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international
cooperation and advance human achievement."); THE GOLDMAN SACHS FOUND., 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 48 (2005) ("The Foundation's mission is to promote excellence and
innovation in education and to improve the academic performance and lifelong
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Although just a small portion of overall charitable activity,7
international giving is critically important to both the nonprofit sector
and U.S. security interests.8 And for international giving by domestic
U.S. private foundations, community foundations, and public
charities, the past decade has presented the best and worst of times.
On the one hand, both large and small U.S. funders, stimulated by
globalization, an increasingly interconnected world, and global
events, have a growing interest in supporting people and improving
conditions outside the United States.9 On the other hand, the federal
government's responses to September 11 have made international
giving more burdensome in what grantmakers perceive to be a hostile
regulatory environment. 10 Furthermore, the U.S. policy approach on
this issue has not evolved to a state in which international
philanthropy is treated as a valuable ally with the means to enhance
and strengthen governmental strategic interests. The conventional
justification for the government's policy responses is that the
administrative costs imposed are necessary to enhance U.S. security
productivity of young people worldwide."); THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 22 (2005) ("The Rockefeller Foundation is a knowledge-based global foundation
with a commitment to enrich and sustain the lives and livelihoods of poor and excluded
people throughout the world."); W.K. KELLOGG FOUND., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 24
(2006) (stating its mission "to help people [in the United States, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and southern Africa] help themselves through the practical application of
knowledge and resources to improve their quality of life and that of future generations");
see also Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles
of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private
Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17 n.36 (2003) (describing historical
connections between private foundations and international grantmaking).
7. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA: 2005, at 170 (2005)
(estimating giving devoted to international affairs at 2% of total charitable activity).
8. See infra Part I.
9. This is perhaps best reflected by the ascendancy of the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, the nation's largest private foundation, which has emphasized international
programming. According to an October 2006 Foundation Center study, "[i]f the Gates
Foundation were excluded from the sample ... international giving would have decreased
4 percent." LOREN RENZ & JOSIE ATIENZA, FOUND. CTR., INTERNATIONAL
GRANTMAKING UPDATE: A SNAPSHOT OF U.S. FOUNDATION TRENDS 3 (2006),
available at http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl-update-2006.pdf.
The June 2006 announcement that Warren Buffett would direct the majority of his
personal fortune to be spent by the Gates Foundation on similar measures further
highlights the prominence and positive trends of international giving. See Timothy L.
O'Brien & Stephanie Saul, Buffett To Give Bulk of Fortune to Gates Charity, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2006, at Al.
10. See LOREN RENZ ET AL., FOUND. CTR., INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING III:
AN UPDATE ON U.S. FOUNDATION TRENDS, at xiv (2004) (reporting that 78% of
grantmakers believe international funding has become more difficult due to government
regulatory initiatives since September 11); Jeff Jones, Nonprofits Fear False Accusations of
Terror Grants, NONPROFIT TIMES, May 1, 2003, at 1.
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and to protect citizens from terrorists." However, this simple
tradeoff fundamentally misperceives the debate. The full effect of the
additional administrative costs placed on U.S. funders cannot be
measured without considering the costs of the additional burdens for
grantmakers, for their organizational effectiveness, and, significantly,
for U.S. security interests. Not only is a robust cost-benefit analysis
missing from this debate, 2 but, as a result, a full accounting of the
security costs associated with the additional burdens remains
unconsidered. The irony is that government efforts to make us more
secure may actually leave us less safe. At the very least, the
calculation used to determine the security benefits offered by greater
regulation must be altered to ensure consideration for the
corresponding security harms.
This Article details how international philanthropy advances
U.S. security interests. Although the work undertaken by charitable
organizations advantages its intended beneficiaries, it simultaneously
generates several important byproducts that serve American
interests. The United States as a whole also benefits from private
overseas giving because philanthropy can be a powerful tool of public
diplomacy: it enhances the U.S. image abroad, facilitates the sharing
of ideas and values, and places U.S. institutions and people as
partners in solving critical social ills. Scholars and policy analysts
have increasingly recognized that it is in the United States's interest
to see additional private resources brought to bear to assist
developing countries build stable societies by addressing poverty,
health crises, environmental degradation, economic development,
educational challenges, and other global problems. In addition, it is
through the support of private U.S. entities that foreign local
nonprofit counterparts in the developing world can be sustained and
strengthened so that they can contribute to the development of civil
society. One central theme of this Article is that international
11. See Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror Finance Program: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 178 (2004) (statement of
Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (acknowledging
government efforts to "enhanc[e] ongoing due diligence efforts, while balancing the
demands on [private and charitable] institutions"); U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Response
to Comments Submitted on the U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities 7 (2006), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/0929%20responsetocomments.pdf ("We
recognize that the information-collection practices are expansive .... This type of
information-gathering is essential for the charity to... be assured that its assets will not be
diverted to terrorist organizations or their support networks.").
12. See Daniel J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 25 PACE L. REV. 219, 231 (2005).
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philanthropy, although independent from government control, helps
to generate "soft power"13 for the U.S. government that is used to
influence others and garner cooperation in global affairs. I take the
position that the U.S. government policy should support international
philanthropy not only for altruistic purposes but also out of
enlightened self-interest.
Despite the many benefits generated by international
philanthropy, U.S. public charities and private foundations with
active international programs bear significant burdens imposed by
antiterrorism measures enacted following the launch of the federal
government's "war on terrorism."' 4 Significantly, a key element of
the Bush administration's efforts to defeat terrorism has centered on
attempting to stem the flow of funds to terrorist groups. 5 In addition
to focusing on global money laundering and freezing assets of known
(and suspected) criminals, 6  the federal government has also
13. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS OF SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS
(2004); see infra Part I.C.
14. See President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOc. 1301 (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
wcomp/v37no37.html; President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/
v37no38.html; President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 109 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v39no5.html. For a critique of the Bush administration's
"war" rhetoric to describe the effort to fight terrorism, see Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a
War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1874-78 (2004); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of
Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435,
452-58 (2005).
15. "The war against terrorism is a new kind of war being fought on many fronts.
Nowhere is this truer than in the fight against terrorist financing. The President has
directed me to take all measures necessary to deprive terrorists of funds." The State of the
International Financial System and the International Monetary Fund: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 107th Cong. 54 (2002) (statement of Paul H. O'Neill,
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (Supp. IV 2004)
(outlining the prohibitions against the financing of terrorism); James B. Johnston,
Implementing New Jersey's Anti-Terrorism Laws To Prevent Terrorist Financing: A
Statutory Analysis of the "Material Support or Resources" Provisions of the September 11,
2001 Anti-Terrorism Act and the "Freezing Funds and Assets Related to Terrorism"
Legislation in the New Jersey Criminal Code, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 85, 86 (2004)
(noting that terrorist financing investigations have become "an integral part of America's
counterterrorism strategy"); John Crewdson & Cam Simpson, U.S. Zeroing In on Terror's
Money Trail, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2002, at N20 (reporting the scope and progress of
government efforts to stop terrorist financing).
16. See Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical and
Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 61-62 (2003). For more on
money laundering and the U.S. effort to obstruct terrorist financing, see Eric J. Gouvin,
Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and the War on
Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955 (2003).
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attempted to prevent nonprofit organizations from being used, even
inadvertently, to support terrorist activities. This Article analyzes the
battery of new legal tools that the federal government has adopted in
order to protect charitable organizations and their funds from
diversion, including Executive Order 13,224 ("Executive Order"), 7
the USA PATRIOT Act,18 and the U.S. Department of the Treasury
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for
U.S.-Based Charities ("Treasury ATF Guidelines" or "Guidelines"). 9
Undoubtedly, the chief goals of these laws, regulations, and
guidelines are to protect U.S. citizens, ensure that charitable assets
are not diverted to terrorists, and weaken support for terrorism.
However, these policies may inadvertently cause more harm than
benefit because they fail to account for the unintended security costs.
This gap is particularly problematic because the security costs are
significant and affect the core of our nonmilitary strategies addressing
the threat of terrorism. These policies not only burden international
giving but also implicate U.S. soft power and governmental
effectiveness on the world stage.
This Article argues that the federal government's overall
approach intended to protect charities from terrorism-particularly
its emphasis on issuing guidelines constraining international giving-
is undermining the efficacy of international philanthropic activities
and thereby hindering the ability of private foundations and public
charities to generate important security benefits for the United States.
A barrage of criticism from the nonprofit sector since the Guidelines
were issued in 2002 has prompted the Treasury Department to make
modest changes to them."° Although the 2006 modifications to the
Treasury ATF Guidelines have reduced some of the administrative
burdens and addressed some of the specific objections from the
nonprofit sector, the fundamental tensions remain. The government
continues to pursue a policy approach that views international
philanthropy through the prism of an exposed threat that requires
containment rather than as a source of governmental power
generating enhanced credibility and legitimacy.
17. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
18. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs/guidelines-charities.pdf.
20. Id. at 2.
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As the government coerces nonprofits to collect and report data
as if they were government agents, nonprofits are pressured into
taking on investigatory responsibilities for which they are ill-
equipped.1 In addition, such actions begin to encroach on the
charitable sector's independence from government and, accordingly,
its claim to the high middle ground staked between the public and
private sectors. These are not merely administrative costs or
theoretical concerns; they also directly implicate organizational
effectiveness and security interests. The government's approach
affects nonprofit behavior 22 and adds levels of bureaucracy to
international philanthropy, creating ripple effects that must be
considered as part of an integrated counterterrorism strategy that
embraces overseas development, seeks to combat negative
perceptions of the United States in the world, and values
international cooperation and influence.
This Article is less about what the federal government can and
cannot do, and more about what deserves consideration when
weighing the costs of the regulatory regime against speculative
benefits. Although the government may regulate charitable giving
abroad by U.S. entities, strategic policymaking in this area offers
opportunities to advance U.S. and humanitarian interests. To begin
our examination, Part I identifies several strategic advantages for the
United States associated with international grantmaking activities by
independent U.S.-based private foundations and public charities.
Essentially, this Part details the ways in which philanthropy supports
U.S. security interests, such as the promotion of civil society in
developing countries through the nourishment of foreign nonprofit
organizations and support for efforts to address the root causes of
terrorism. This in turn creates a positive image of the United States
among foreign audiences and generates the soft power necessary to
lead and influence foreign governments. This Part explains and
expands on the theoretical origins of soft power as they relate to
nonprofit organizations and governmental power.
Part II provides a brief explanation of the relevant tax laws and
regulations concerning overseas philanthropic activity in place prior
to September 11 that provide ample due diligence mechanisms to
guard against abuses. This Part also describes the new legal and
policy restrictions on international philanthropy adopted after
September 11 to protect U.S. organizations from being duped by
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
foreign organizations. It also argues that the regulatory regime has
misdirected its efforts by focusing on "indirect" charitable abuse,
whereby legitimate U.S. charitable organizations purportedly are
conned by foreign entities fronting terrorist operations.
Part III analyzes some specific problems with the policy
approaches the federal government has followed. In particular, it
explains how the seemingly modest suggestions put forward in the
Treasury ATF Guidelines are not well-attuned to the realities and
nuances of conducting philanthropy overseas and how they
undermine the public perception of the nonprofit sector's
independence from government and impede the sector's ability to
generate the many aforementioned benefits of international
philanthropy that can help enhance our long-term security.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of potential
alternative policy prescriptions to balance the need to protect U.S.
funders from unwittingly supporting terrorist activities while also
supporting their efforts to engage in positive philanthropic endeavors
across the globe that contribute to U.S. security. This Part argues for
more expansive and formal cost-benefit analysis and the creation of
safe harbors to protect U.S. charities engaged in international giving.
It also explores reforms that might include altering new regulatory
controls, such as the Treasury ATF Guidelines and the Executive
Order, as well as revamping preexisting law governing procedures for
international giving by private foundations.
In recent years, several commentators have criticized some of the
government's post-September 11 policies and urged changes on a
wide range of issues.2 3 With respect to international grantmaking, our
current regime has focused primarily on the potential benefits from
increased regulation of charities in order to curtail the financing of
terrorism, but there has been a systematic disregard of the costs-the
security tradeoffs-associated with encumbering international
23. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958, 989 (2002) (criticizing
the government for acting "as if we are free to ignore international norms whenever it
serves our interests" as well as for "trading immigrants' rights for our own purported
security"); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1497-1500 (2003) (criticizing the Bush administration's largely unilateralist approach to
combating terrorism and violating international law in the process); Winston P. Nagan &
Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375, 402 (2004) (criticizing the influence of "isolationism and
exceptionalism" on U.S. foreign relations policy); John S. Richbourg, Liberty and Security:
The Yin and Yang of Immigration Law, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 475, 477-80, 506-07 (2003)
(criticizing the development of U.S. "immigration policies on the basis of fear" after
September 11).
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philanthropy. Only by identifying the benefits generated by high
levels of international philanthropy and the negative effects of
additional regulation is it possible for our debate over appropriate
policy choices to capture not just an understanding of the speculative
security benefits from increased regulation but also a sense of some of
the security costs. From that vantage point, a more accurate cost-
benefit analysis can be developed, perhaps even leading to a more
balanced and enlightened policy response that seeks to support, or
even expand, opportunities for international engagement by
American charities and grantmakers as a means of countering
terrorism.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OVERSEAS
GRANTMAKING
In today's complex world, U.S. security is bound up with global
affairs and issues. In fact, in 2002, the Bush administration explicitly
acknowledged foreign development aid as a key component of U.S.
national security.24 Of course, since World War II and throughout the
Cold War, foreign aid has been an essential instrument of
government policy.25 After experiencing declines through the 1990s, 26
both military and nonmilitary development aid have increased
significantly in the wake of September 11. Since those terrorist
attacks of 2001, U.S. official development assistance ("ODA"), which
represents nonmilitary support to developing countries for economic
development and welfare, rose from approximately $10 billion in 2000
to $19 billion in 2004.27 Despite this dramatic increase in funding,
24. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 21 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Gail
Russell Chaddock, A Bush Vision of Pax Americana, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 23,
2002, at 1.
25. See Carol C. Adelman, The Privatization of Foreign Aid: Reassessing National
Largesse, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 9. Throughout the Cold War, however,
development aid was often granted for geopolitical ends rather than strategic human
development purposes. See Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration
over Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 69, 91 n.70 (2002); W. Michael
Reisman, Commentary, International Law After the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 863
(1990).
26. See Charles Babington & Thomas W. Lippman, First Lady Joins Effort on
Diplomacy Funds: Business, Other Groups Fighting GOP Budget Cuts, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 1999, at A25 (noting U.S. spending on foreign aid declined throughout the early and
mid-1990s).
27. See LARRY NOWELS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
FOREIGN AID: UNDERSTANDING DATA USED TO COMPARE DONORS 2 (2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/row/RS22032.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
State, The United States and International Development: Fostering Hope Through
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which makes the U.S. government the world's leading donor in terms
of overall volume, the United States ranks near the bottom (second to
last) of the twenty-two major aid donor nations in terms of
percentage of gross national income targeted to development
assistance. The U.S. ODA per capita contribution was more than
forty percent lower than our continental counterparts in the
European Union.29
Although foreign aid architecture is complex, involving multiple
partners, when it comes to measuring contributions from the United
States to developing countries, substantial foreign aid is delivered
outside official government aid channels, primarily through nonprofit
organizations. Although exact measures of foreign contributions by
charitable U.S. organizations are difficult to obtain, estimates of
private international philanthropy from U.S.-based public charities
and private foundations would unquestionably greatly augment levels
of overall aid to the developing world donated by the U.S.
government. Economist Jeffrey Sachs writes that U.S.
nongovernmental entities provide approximately $3 billion per year
in development assistance.3" The U.S. Department of State, however,
estimated that U.S. private charitable sources donated nearly $7
billion to developing countries in 2004.31 And recently, a private U.S.
think tank-the Hudson Institute-issued a report compiling data on
public and private engagement in the developing world.32 While the
overall report included several means of engagement with the
developing world, it estimated that private charitable organizations
based in the United States donated approximately $13.6 billion in
2004.33
Growth 1 (May 31, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
47055.pdf. Iraq's aid allotment accounted for approximately 16% and 37% of total U.S.
development assistance in 2004 and 2005, respectively. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
State, The United States and International Development: Partnering for Growth (May 10,
2006), [hereinafter Press Release, Partnering for Growth] available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66060.htm.
28. See NOWELS, supra note 27, at 5.
29. See id. at 6.
30. See JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR
OUR TIME 303 (2005) (citing figures from the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")).
31. See Press Release, Partnering for Growth, supra note 27.
32. See HUDSON INST., THE INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY (Karina Rollins ed.,
2006), available at http://gpr.hudson.org/files/publications/globalphilanthropy.pdf.
33. According to the report, private foundations contributed $3.4 billion, public
charities contributed $5.7 billion, and religious organizations donated $4.5 billion. See id.
at 20-28. The report also measured corporate contributions, the monetary value of
donated volunteer time, the value of university scholarships to American institutions, and
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Although the estimates of giving may vary, the significance of
private aid is undisputed. Even taking the smallest estimate of $3
billion, the contributions of U.S. private foundations and public
charities exceed the official development assistance aid of all but six
of the twenty-two major government donors, including Sweden,34
which is known as the "darling of the Third World"35 because of the
high amount of its foreign aid as a percentage of the country's overall
gross national product ("GNP"). Obviously, the larger estimates
simply magnify the effects. Moreover, as voices from the left call for
even larger U.S. aid contributions commensurate with the GNP
levels36 of our counterparts and voices on the right claim that
criticisms of U.S. aid levels are unfounded in part because they fail to
account for contributions from private sources,3" international
philanthropy takes on an increasingly important position as part of
the United States's international aid story. In many ways, even
without a formal relationship, international philanthropy represents a
form of a public-private partnership between government and
charitable organizations through which the nonprofit sector is an ally
in U.S. development assistance efforts. Accordingly, a strong public
policy interest exists for encouraging international philanthropy.
Although these figures provide a sense of the monetary stakes,
more than just money is at issue. As one commentator has noted,
charitable organizations are "delivering more than just money to
developing countries. They are delivering the values of freedom,
democracy, entrepreneurship, and volunteerism. ''38  In addition,
charitable assistance contributes to increased security both abroad
and here at home. International grantmaking facilitates the
development of civil society in the developing world, contributing to
greater global security and enhancing the public image and public
diplomacy efforts of the United States. Perhaps more important, it
serves as a means of engendering cooperation with allies through the
buildup of soft power.
private remittances. See id. at 22-34. However, I have excluded those amounts for the
purposes of this analysis focused on international giving by charitable organizations.
34. See NOWELS, supra note 27, at 5.
35. See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1667, 1689 (2003) (noting Sweden's reputation in the developing world).
36. See, e.g., SACHS, supra note 30, at 288-303.
37. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 25, at 9.
38. Id. at 14.
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A. International Philanthropy as a Facilitator of Civil Society
International aid is a powerful weapon in promoting civil society
and advancing social and economic development across the globe. To
that end, development aid also advances U.S. security interests by
alleviating some of the situational factors, such as poverty, political
oppression, and social inequality, that may breed terrorists and
produce weak states where terrorism thrives, and replacing them with
conditions for economic growth, trade, and private investment. 9 As
the United States seeks to understand and respond to security threats
as well as prevent further conflict, development aid emerges as a key
element of foreign policy.4 °
The profound impact of the September 11 attacks and the
resulting campaign against terrorism has led scholars and citizens
alike to consider and debate the sources of anti-American terrorism
and the proper responses to the challenges posed by such violence.4"
Although various arguments and theories have been put forward,
several scholars and commentators have noted the ways in which
economic desperation, disease, and global poverty, among other
socioeconomic deficiencies, contribute to the foundational origins of
terrorism.42 Although there may not be a direct causal link,43
39. See Stuart Eizenstat et al., Rebuilding Weak States, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 134, 135-36,139-41; Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development, and Trade: Winning
the War on Terror Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 599-600 (2004).
40. The case for foreign aid to developing countries has been put forward by a variety
of economists, development experts, and political figures. See, e.g., SACHS, supra note 30,
at 244-65, 329-46 (arguing that countries beset by instability and poverty can, with
adequate financial assistance, be transformed into emerging market economies); Colin L.
Powell, No Country Left Behind, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 28, 30 (former U.S.
Secretary of State arguing that development assistance is an essential element of U.S.
national security policy and acknowledging that the Bush administration recognizes a
"link between terrorism and poverty"). Foreign aid, however, has been criticized for
advancing multinational corporate interests at the expense of poor countries, see, e.g.,
JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
525-26 (2d ed. 2004); Michael Dobbs, Aid Abroad Is Business Back Home, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 2001, at Al, and for extreme waste and corruption, see, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY,
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES AND
MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2002); MICHAEL MAREN, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE
RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997).
41. See, e.g., Graham E. Fuller, Terrorism: Sources and Cures, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO WINNING THE WAR ON TERRORISM 15 (Adam Garfinkle ed., 2004); Michael J.
Kelly, Understanding September lth-An International Legal Perspective on the War in
Afghanistan, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 283 (2002); John Quigley, Identifying the Origins of
Anti-American Terrorism, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1003 (2004); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda,
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 329 (2002).
42. See, e.g., CORALIE BRYANT & CHRISTINA KAPPAZ, REDUCING POVERTY,
BUILDING PEACE 26 (2005) (noting that al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden's "support is
strong among many poor who see him as working to fight the injustice they face in their
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international development experts Coralie Bryant and Christina
Kappaz persuasively argue that "poverty, inequality, and social
exclusion create circumstances that lead to or abet violence."" Put
slightly differently, poverty, poor health, environmental degradation,
and other social ills provide fertile ground for terrorism to thrive. If
we take these views seriously, as I think we should, the promotion of
poverty reduction, self-determination, and human rights must be an
integral part of a complete strategy to defeat terrorism.
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission indicated that a
"comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include
economic policies that encourage development, more open societies,
and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and
to enhance prospects for their children's future."45 Addressing the
socioeconomic roots of the discontent and inequity that lead to
extremism is an important part of the strategy to enhance national
security.46 Accordingly, policymakers should be especially cautious
when developing policies that directly and indirectly implicate
strategic support for overseas development.
lives"); PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 31 (2002) (discussing
policy initiatives connected to root causes of terrorism); James Gomez, September 11:
Asian Perspectives, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 705, 712 (2003) ("Terrorism was seen
as arising from surging global poverty and recommendations were made that this issue be
dealt with effectively. In this respect, counter-terrorist strategies were urged to include
the elimination of the root causes of poverty."); Lee H. Hamilton, Fighting Terrorism, 12
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379, 382 (2005) ("We need a comprehensive strategy that
balances and integrates all elements of American power.... [including] helping to reverse
the causes of terrorism by promoting social and political rights, and the rule of law in
repressive societies; working to reduce the poverty and unemployment that create an
opening for terrorist recruitment; [and] promoting education abroad, so young Muslims
have alternatives to radical and hate-filled teachings ...."); Shashi Tharoor, September 11,
2002: Understanding and Defeating Terrorism, One Year Later, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 9, 11 (2003) (acknowledging the role of "the scourges of poverty, of famine, of
illiteracy, of ill-health, of injustice, and of human insecurity"); Adam Garfinkle, The
Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy, NAT'L INT., Fall 2002, at 156
(arguing that poverty and disinformation in Arab countries contribute to terrorism).
43. See BRYANT & KAPPAZ, supra note 42, at 8; BRUCE W. JENTLESON, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: THE DYNAMICS OF CHOICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 407 (2004).
44. See BRYANT & KAPPAZ, supra note 42, at 159.
45. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 379.
46. See JENTLESON, supra note 43, at 407; SACHS, supra note 30, at 330-31 ("Whether
terrorists are rich or poor or middle class, their staging areas-their bases of operation-
are unstable societies beset by poverty, unemployment, rapid population growth, hunger,
and lack of hope. Without addressing the root causes of that instability, little will be
accomplished in stanching terror.").
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U.S. private foundations and public charities,47 in control of
substantial capital resources, are well equipped and positioned to
provide financial and human resources to address those root-cause
issues.48 Unquestionably, philanthropic capital remains limited, and
nonprofit organizations cannot solve global poverty and related
problems alone. However, such private aid is particularly and
uniquely valuable because of the sheer magnitude of resources
nonprofits offer, the greater flexibility they possess as compared to
the government in the allocation of funds, and the instrumental role
independent nonprofits have in building coalitions across sectors and
coordinating strategy among grassroots nonprofit organizations.49
Even in terms of cash, nonprofit donations offer advantages because
much of U.S. government assistance is delivered through "tied aid"
that links contributions to the purchase of services and goods from
the donating country. 0  Therefore, development aid through
nonprofits is both more efficient and actually worth more to
recipients than equivalent government dollars.5'
Importantly, philanthropic activity, in the developing world in
particular, helps foster democratic governance by supporting and
nurturing independent voices, building social capital to support
democracy, and developing natural allies with like-minded
47. Both private foundations and public charities are tax-exempt organizations
classified under the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). Private
foundations are generally created, funded, and controlled by an individual, a family, or a
corporation, and commonly engage in grantmaking as their primary activity. Public
charities are nonprofits with financial support drawn from a broad base of donors,
substantial government support, or some form of public control, and commonly operate
their own charitable services or programs. See I.R.C. § 509; Susan N. Gary, Regulating the
Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV.
593, 631 (1999).
48. See Helmut Anheier & Adele Simmons, The Role of Philanthropy in
Globalization, in RETHINKING PHILANTHROPIC EFFECTIVENESS: LESSONS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF FOUNDATION EXPERTS 10, 23 (Dirk Eilinghoff ed.,
2005); see also RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 19 (estimating that international giving by
U.S. private foundations alone totaled $3.2 billion in 2002).
49. See Anheier & Simmons, supra note 48, at 11.
50. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, at 102
(Charlotte Denny ed., 2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/
HDR05scomplete.pdf ("According to OECD reports on tied aid to least developed
countries, the United States tops the tied aid list .... "); see also CURT TARNOFF &
LARRY NOWELS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FOREIGN
AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 18 (2004),
available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/trade/files/98-916.pdf ("Most U.S.
foreign aid is used for procurement of U.S. goods and services ... ").
51. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 50, at 102 (noting that tied aid reduces
the value of assistance by 11% to 30%).
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constituencies. For instance, in the Arab world, many local nonprofit
organizations frequently provide alternatives to radical groups and
ideas opposed to the United States.52 Consistent with the charitable
goals of their U.S. funders, foreign grant recipients often pursue goals
associated with U.S. interests or mainstream American values or
both, such as advancing education, youth development, microfinance,
economic development, the environment, and women's rights.53 The
local foreign nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), which are
frequently small with strong community ties, help alter political and
social landscapes and provide critical building blocks for civil
society.54  Close working relationships with experienced U.S.
charitable organizations (something the U.S. government cannot
offer) also can strengthen and educate a local foreign charity.
Additionally, as explained above, private foundations in particular
bring unique advantages in their ability to bring people together in
ways that no formal U.S. government program is capable of doing.5
In addition to providing altruistic benefit and helping address
potential root causes of terrorism, international aid efforts to promote
civil society and democratic governance advance U.S. security
interests.56
52. See, e.g., JANINE A. CLARK, ISLAM, CHARITY, AND ACTIVISM: MIDDLE-CLASS
NETWORKS AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN EGYPT, JORDAN, AND YEMEN (2003) (examining
the structure and dynamics of moderate Islamic institutions, including the Islamic Center
Charity Society in Jordan and the Islah Women's Charitable Society in Yemen, and the
social and political impact of the organizations); Sabrina Tavernise, Iraqi Charities Plant
the Seed of Civil Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at Al; Holly Yettick, Locals Fund
Real Dream: A Pakistani Schoolhouse, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Feb. 11,
2002, at A12 (describing a Pakistani school modeled after U.S. schools intended to provide
an alternative to religious madrassas).
53. See generally RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 53-77 (describing the programmatic
giving trends and habits of private funders engaged in international grantmaking).
54. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 336-49 (2000); Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the
Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 291 (2004) (stating that
"participation in voluntary associations is one of the principal methods for assuring an
active citizenry"); Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830-31 (2003) (describing the
charitable sector's role in constructing and maintaining civil society).
55. See supra text accompanying note 49.
56. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 33 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/
nss2006.pdf ("Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats
to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.
Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening
responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people's lives.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Finally, active engagement by and support from U.S. funders
working with foreign nonprofits advances U.S. policy interests by
helping developing countries achieve economic growth, establish
stable middle classes, and actively engage in the global economy,57 all
of which lead to more stable states and potential strategic allies.58 Of
course, grantmaking programs and giving priorities are diverse, but
studies have revealed that international grant support increasingly has
targeted grassroots "community improvement, microenterprise
development, primary health care, primary and secondary education,
refugee and migration issues, women's rights, resource conservation,
and local media and communications. ' '59 Moreover, this presumably
advances U.S. interests because successful economic and political
development abroad opens new, stable markets to U.S. goods and
generates new opportunities for investment. 60  Thus, philanthropy's
increased support of development aid can provide the twin benefits of
enhancing political stability and expanding markets for U.S. products
as well as reducing the potential pool of human capital recruits for
terrorist groups.
B. International Philanthropy as an Agent of Public Diplomacy
Another important means by which international philanthropic
activity supports U.S. security interests is through building a positive
image of the United States and enhancing U.S. public diplomacy
efforts. As America engages in its global effort to fight the growth
and support of terrorist activities, it is critically important for the
57. See Karin Aggestam, Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottles?, in
MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOs 12, 16-17 (Henry Carey & Oliver
Richmond eds., 2003) ("NGOs have become significant actors in economic development
[abroad], particularly in the last ten years .... ); see also Amy J. Cohen, Debating the
Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 295, 323 (2006) (describing the "significantly enhance[d] ... role of international
donor agencies and NGOs in the regulation and negotiation of everyday life," particularly
in weak states).
58. Research has found a positive relationship between aid and growth. See Henrik
Hansen & Finn Tarp, Aid Effectiveness Disputed, in FOREIGN AID AND DEVELOPMENT:
LESSONS LEARNT AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 103 (Finn Tarp ed., 2000).
59. RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 53.
60. See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International
Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12
(1989); Carl B. Kress, The United States Government and Post-Conflict Economic
Reconstruction, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75, 94 (2004); see also SACHS, supra
note 30, at 10-14 (discussing the success of nonprofit organizations in Bangladesh,
including the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee and Grameen Bank, at
achieving economic growth and improvements in health and education and a place worthy
of investment).
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United States to secure the support of the peoples of the world. A
successful campaign against terrorism will rely heavily on
international intelligence, influence, and the cooperation of allies.6
One important tool for acquiring the necessary influence and
cooperation is public diplomacy.62
Public diplomacy captures a dimension of international relations
beyond the official state-to-state diplomacy conducted through
government officials. It seeks to inform and influence public attitudes
of foreign citizens by generating understanding and goodwill,
primarily through the delivery of information and communication
outreach by government directly to the public, as well as through the
promotion of direct dialogue between citizens (i.e., cultural and
educational exchanges). Specifically targeted at a mass audience,
public diplomacy is based on. the recognition that public opinion
abroad can exert influence on foreign governments and political
systems.63 Public diplomacy requires the effective communication of
political messages and outreach aimed at generating goodwill. 64 As a
result, the generosity of U.S. individuals and institutions helps
develop positive reputational benefits and goodwill for all Americans
and the country as a whole.
With respect to the attitudes of foreign audiences, the United
States faces mounting difficulties.65  Several studies and public
61. See generally PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 114-18 (2003) (discussing the importance of relations with
allies).
62. See PHILIP SEIB, BEYOND THE FRONT LINES: HOW THE NEWS MEDIA COVER A
WORLD SHAPED BY WAR, at xvi (2004) (explaining the importance of public diplomacy
after September 11); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of United States Foreign
Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149, 223 (2004) ("Public
diplomacy is an essential-one might say the most essential-tool in the American foreign
policy arsenal."). Certainly, I would acknowledge that public diplomacy is only part of the
solution. While U.S. communications and image may not be the sole source of national
security threats, they contribute to our ability to deal with the challenges arising from
substantive policy disagreements, socioeconomic disparities, and political and religious
extremism, especially in the developing world.
63. See SHAUN RIORDAN, THE NEW DIPLOMACY 123 (2003) ("[P]ublics matter more
than before.... [because] governments, at whatever level, have to win support and
legitimacy from domestic publics for their foreign-policy positions; they must also win over
foreign publics if they want to secure the agreement to policy positions from their
governments.").
64. See id.; Joseph A. Keeler, Genocide: Prevention Through Nonmilitary Measures,
171 MIL. L. REV. 135, 145-46 (2002).
65. As recently as 2004, a U.S. Pentagon report declared U.S. public diplomacy to be
in "a state of crisis." See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD TASK FORCE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 14 (2004), available at
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opinion polls taken worldwide reveal that America's image abroad
has suffered in recent years. Attitudes toward the United States are
especially negative in the Muslim world.66 In a recent study, a
majority of citizens in five of six predominantly Muslim countries
surveyed (Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey)
expressed unfavorable opinions of the United States; Morocco was
the lone exception.67 Importantly, this phenomenon is equally
pronounced among Western countries, as a 2005 survey in Australia
indicates:
[B]arely more than half the Australians polled had positive
feelings about the United States, although 84 percent saw Japan
positively, and 86 percent viewed the United Kingdom
positively. Worse, 57 percent of Australians perceived
America's foreign policies as a potential threat-equivalent to
the percentage of Australians worried about the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism.66
Further, Australia is hardly an outlier. Public opinion polls of
the peoples of France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and
Turkey, among other nations, have reported similar declines.69 More
troubling, another report reveals that, in addition to the United
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic-Communication.pdf; Robert Burns,
Panel: U.S. Actions Fuel Extremists, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2004, at 30.
66. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-535, U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: STATE DEPARTMENT EFFORTS To ENGAGE MUSLIM AUDIENCES LACK
CERTAIN COMMUNICATION ELEMENTS AND FACE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES 1 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf.
67. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM: COMMON CONCERN
FOR MUSLIM AND WESTERN PUBLICS 14 (2005), available at http://pewglobal.org/
reports/pdf/248.pdf; see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 375 ("By 2003,
polls showed that 'the bottom had fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim
world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to
countries in the Middle East, have spread.'" (quoting Press Release, Pew Global
Attitudes Project, War with Iraq Further Divides Global Publics but World Embraces
Democratic Values and Free Markets (June 3, 2003))); Farah Stockman, US Image a
Tough Sell in Mideast, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2005, at A5 ("Opinion polls across the
Muslim world suggest that favorability ratings of the United States have dropped into the
single digits after the Iraq war, even in friendly countries like Egypt and Jordan.").
68. Joshua Kurlantzick, The Decline of American Soft Power, CURRENT HIST., Dec.
2005, at 419, 419.
69. See PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA'S IMAGE FURTHER ERODES,
EUROPEANS WANT WEAKER TIES 1 (2003), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/
pdf/175.pdf; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-323, U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS HAMPERED BY THE LACK OF A
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, U.S.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2005], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf (noting
that opinion polling data from Western and Muslim countries "indicate that the United
States faces a chronic and widespread image problem").
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States's overall image problems, foreign views about the American
people have declined as well: "The favorability ratings of Americans
have declined since 2002 in 9 of the 12 countries for which trend data
exists ... 70
Negative foreign attitudes should be of concern to policymakers
because, as a recent federal government report noted, weak images
abroad can "increase foreign public support for terrorism directed at
Americans, impact the cost and effectiveness of military operations,
[and] weaken the United States' ability to align with other nations in
pursuit of common policy objectives ... ,,71 Thus, public diplomacy
promotes U.S. national interests by informing, engaging, and
influencing peoples around the world. Indeed, public diplomacy-
with its long and rich history72-is becoming increasingly important in
light of the limitations of government-to-government diplomacy
produced by globalization and technological advances in
communications. 73 There is now an even greater need for direct
dialogue and communication, requiring government-to-foreign citizen
communication through public diplomacy.
Although there are multiple tools of public diplomacy,
philanthropic support from the United States for foreign nonprofit
organizations is a vital one. Government need not be the only
generator of public diplomacy; private channels, sources, and entities
can help address U.S. "image" problems. For instance, "Americans'
perceived lack of empathy toward the pain, hardship, and tragic plight
of peoples throughout the developing world" 74 may be offset by
charitable support abroad. Evidence demonstrates that aid and
philanthropic activity make a difference in creating positive relations
and goodwill. For example, research indicates that U.S. tsunami
relief efforts in Asia have generated more favorable attitudes toward
70. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, U.S. IMAGE UP SLIGHTLY, BUT STILL
NEGATIVE 20 (2005), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247.pdf.
71. GAO REPORT, U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2005, supra note 69, at 1.
72. See generally RICHARD T. ARNDT, THE FIRST RESORT OF KINGS: AMERICAN
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005).
73. SASKIA SUSSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION, at xi-xii (1996) (explaining that traditional governmental institutions
and relationships have been transformed by globalization and technology); Victor A.
Kremenyuk, The Emerging System of International Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES 22, 23-24, 26-27 (Victor A.
Kremenyuk ed., 2002) (discussing the importance of actors other than nation-states in
international relations in light of growing interdependence on environmental, economic,
and security matters).
74. Peter G. Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 74, 76.
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the United States.75 Admittedly, because nonprofit organizations
operate apart from and independent of the U.S. government, they are
only partly responsive to its concerns. Nonprofits, like other private
entities or persons acting outside the control of government, may
even engage in activities or practices that can undercut a positive
image.76 On balance, however, it seems likely that the benefits of
philanthropy for public diplomacy outweigh the risks of harm.
If public diplomacy is to be truly effective in communicating and
educating the world about the United States, it must fully embrace
the major components of American organizational life, including
nonprofit entities. The United States is more than just government
and business, and the critically important-and oft-overlooked-
nonprofit sector reflects the very essence and values of the country
and its citizens.77 More than merely talking or theorizing about the
United States and its values, international philanthropy places them
on display. Philanthropy and charity are an important part of the
American story78 and, ultimately, a part of modern diplomacy.79
75. See CRAIG CHARNEY & NICOLE YAKATAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
A NEW BEGINNING: STRATEGIES FOR A MORE FRUITFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE
MUSLIM WORLD 6 (2005), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/Anti-AmericanCSR.pdf ("[F]ocus groups demonstrate that Muslims view
the United States more favorably when they learn about American aid.... U.S. tsunami
relief has improved attitudes toward America in Indonesia .... "); THE PEW GLOBAL
ATTITUDES PROJECT, supra note 70, at 4 ("The U.S. tsunami relief effort led to more
favorable views of the U.S. for most nations surveyed.").
76. See Alastair Pennycook & Sophie Coutand-Marin, Teaching English as a
Missionary Language, 24 DISCOURSE: STUD. IN CULTURAL POL. OF EDUC. 337, 337-38
(2003) (raising concerns about Christian evangelicals using the false pretense of English
language education to conduct missionary outreach in foreign countries).
77. See Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers:
Supporting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
1089, 1094-1102 (2001).
78. For a discussion of the role of philanthropy in U.S. history, see CHARITY,
PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 2.
79. See RIORDAN, supra note 63, at 122.
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As globalization changes the world, ° our approach to diplomacy
must evolve to engage the benefits of both traditional government-to-
government communication and public diplomacy, which demands
sophisticated operations on both governmental and nongovernmental
levels. Promoting linkages-a means of direct connection-between
American institutions and foreign NGOs encourages the dialogue,
sharing of ideas, and personal and institutional relationships that
should be part of the new framework of our national diplomatic
policy to support long-term security interests.
C. International Philanthropy as a Source of Soft Power
International philanthropy can also provide a valuable source of
power benefiting the United States. While related to, yet different
from, public diplomacy, the concept of soft power both captures and
broadens the benefits and effects associated with positive image
abroad. Several experts and scholars have argued that an effective
counterterrorism policy must rely on more than just strength.
Political scientist Joseph Nye argues that to succeed in international
politics, America must use both hard power (e.g., military and
economic might) and soft power, which he defines as the ability to co-
opt others to want the same outcomes as you through intangible
attraction to shared values, thereby shaping the preferences of
others.81 Although hard power is well understood and often utilized
on the world stage, soft power is less understood and, with respect to
the United States, on the decline. 2 Professor Nye contends that the
United States cannot defeat terrorism without attracting moderates
80. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: How GLOBALIZATION IS
RESHAPING OUR LIVES (2000); SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (1998); Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization,
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243,
246-47 (2000); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 551-52 (2005); Laura Spitz, The Gift of Enron: An
Opportunity To Talk About Capitalism, Equality, Globalization, and the Promise of a
North-American Charter of Fundamental Rights, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 338-41 (2005);
Gary Minda, Globalization of Culture, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 589, 591 (2000) (reviewing
DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN
WORLD (1998)).
81. See NYE, supra note 13, at 5.
82. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Decline of America's Soft Power, FOREIGN AFF., May-
June 2004, at 1; see also Robert Cooper, The Goals of Diplomacy, Hard Power, and Soft
Power, in AMERICAN POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 167, 167 (David Held &
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2004) ("America seems to be hard power incarnate and
Europe the embodiment of soft power."); Kurlantzick, supra note 68, at 420-21
(describing the decline of American soft power).
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around the world83 and that the Bush administration may have
"focused too heavily on hard power and not taken enough account of
soft power."'
Although power has been defined many different ways, the
definition typically includes an ability to influence or control others. 5
Rather than exercising power over others through military and
economic strength, countries may also rely on indirect methods to
achieve their goals, namely attracting and persuading other
governments and publics to adopt the same goals.8 6 Soft power
reflects this indirect ability to elicit cooperation through attraction to
shared values, common aspirations, and the inspiration they ignite in
others.87 Drawn from a country's values, culture, and foreign
policies,8" soft power is built through a combination of government
action and action by nonstate actors. Ultimately, nations with
significant soft power "find that citizens of other countries aspire to
share their values and institutions, and leaders of foreign countries
view their policies as legitimate and want to follow their lead." 89
Examining the level of transparency can help to differentiate soft
power from public diplomacy. Efforts to influence foreign publics
83. See NYE, supra note 13, at 131.
84. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Hard Power, Soft Power, and "The War on Terrorism," in
AMERICAN POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 82, at 114,124.
85. See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER, MANAGING WITH POWER 30 (1992) (defining power
as "the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome
resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do"); Peter Blau,
Differentiation of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH
293, 293 (Roderick Bell et al. eds., 1969) ("[P]ower refers to all kinds of influence between
persons or groups. ); Jamison E. Colburn, "Democratic Experimentalism": A
Separation of Powers for Our Time?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 287, 304 n.48 (2004)
(" '[P]ower' can take an infinite number of forms .... Many are best described as modes
of influence."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy,
5 NEV. L.J. 347, 354-55 n.40 (noting that "the definition of power involves the ability to
control or influence other's behaviors"); Nye, supra note 84, at 117 ("[P]ower is the ability
to get the outcomes you want, and to affect the behavior of others to make this happen.").
See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 154-60 (2005) (discussing definitions of power).
86. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 220
(3d ed. 2001) (defining soft power as "the ability to get desired outcomes because others
want what you want" and "the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction
rather than coercion").
87. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE
WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 8-9 (2002).
88. See NYE, supra note 13, at 68 ("The image of the United States and its
attractiveness to others is a composite of many different ideas and attitudes. It depends in
part on culture, in part on domestic policies and values, and in part on the substance,
tactics, and style of our foreign policies.").
89. Kurlantzick, supra note 68, at 420.
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through public diplomacy are overt and focused on direct
communication, whereas soft power, with its focus on attraction to
values and ideals, exercises influence through more subtle, diffuse,
and indirect means. To use an analogy to the corporate world, public
diplomacy is more like public relations and soft power is more like
brand image. Sophisticated corporations attempt to win customers
through communication via the media and other sources using public
relations, but they also devote substantial resources to developing a
brand identity and image that commands awareness, meaning, and
esteem. The best brand marketers ensure that all of their actions,
communications, and other choices reinforce the brand image so that
audiences understand and are attracted to the brand because of what
it represents and because of its ability to tap into an individual's
aspirations or self-image.90
Although governments certainly use soft power, it is not
something that exclusively belongs to or is controlled by the province
of government. To the contrary, both public and private sources can
wield their own soft power, and Nye's interpretation of the concept
recognizes that private, nongovernmental forces and institutions can
enhance governmental soft power.9" With respect to nonstate actors,
Nye and others have focused largely on the influential role that
culture 92 and commerce play in "getting others to want the outcomes
90. See generally DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING
ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME (1991); DOUGLAS B. HOLT, How BRANDS BECOME
ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING (2004); KEVIN LANE KELLER,
STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND
EQUITY (2d ed. 2003); Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing
Relationship Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (1998).
91. See NYE, supra note 13, at 10.
92. With respect to culture as a source of soft power, the United States's image and its
attractiveness are shaped and expressed by mediums such as literature, art, education, and
popular culture. See NYE, supra note 13, at 11; see also Josef Joffe, Who's Afraid of Mr.
Big?, NAT'L INT., Summer 2001, at 43 ("U.S. culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward
with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire-but with a novel twist.
Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders.
America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets."). These
and other forms of U.S. cultural values are most obviously conveyed through mass
entertainment but also through commerce, personal contacts, and citizen visits and
exchanges. See NYE, supra note 13, at 44-55. The influential German foreign policy
analyst and magazine editor Josef Joffe has argued that cultural attraction, ideology, and
agenda-setting have become significant currencies of power in modern times compared to
more traditional currencies tied to military strength. See Josef Joffe, America the
Inescapable, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
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that you want. '93 For example, Nye notes that American soft power
has been largely created by cultural forces transmitted through
mediums such as popular films and television, multinational
corporations, brand icons, and even celebrities and sports figures. 94
Since culture is crafted and deployed by a variety of forces-including
those outside the control of government-it makes sense that cultural
attractiveness is, in part, dependent on the products and efforts of
private entities.
Nye's analysis of private interests contributing to a nation's soft
power emphasizes contributions from corporations and Hollywood
movie studios.95 With respect to nonprofit organizations, he primarily
stresses how charitable institutions exercise their own soft power to
influence others on behalf of their own interests.96 A more subtle
point that Nye acknowledges, but one I wish to highlight and expand
here, is the role that U.S. public charities and private foundations play
in enhancing the interests-that is, the soft power-of the United
States.97
Nye primarily views international nonprofit organizations as
attracting their own followers, giving them clout to influence
governments. 98 To the extent that Nye is principally conceiving of
NGOs as large, multinational public charities, his assessment is surely
accurate. However, that perspective requires reformulation when
thinking about the broader spectrum of private foundations and
smaller public charities. A nonprofit organization that is able to
93. NYE, supra note 13, at 5; see also Josef Joffe, How America Does It, 7 FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 13, 24 (describing soft power as stemming from cultural and
economic strength).
94. NYE, supra note 13, at 17 ("Much of American soft power has been produced by
Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft, and Michael Jordan."); see also KISHORE MAHBUBANI,
BEYOND THE AGE OF INNOCENCE: REBUILDING TRUST BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE
WORLD 3-5 (2005) (discussing the power of American culture, icons, and brands to
influence and inspire foreign citizens); Josef Joffe, Editorial, Looking Out for No. 1 by
Looking Out for Others, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at El ("[The United States] is
definitely in a class of its own in the soft power game.... All [of Europe, Japan, China
and Russia's] movie studios together could not break the hold of Hollywood. Nor could a
consortium of their universities dethrone Harvard et al., which dominate academia while
luring the best and the brightest from abroad.").
95. See NYE, supra note 13, at 12-13. Of course, actions by corporations and film and
production studios may also work against government interests. For instance, "Hollywood
movies that show scantily clad women with libertine attitudes ... undercut government
efforts to improve relations with Islamic nations." Id. at 15.
96. See NYE, supra note 87, at 11 ("[N]ongovernmental groups develop soft power of
their own.... ").
97. NYE, supra note 13, at 73 ("[N]onstate actors ... also possess soft power that can
be used to help or hinder the United States' achievement of its preferred outcomes.").
98. See id. at 90-91.
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generate its own soft power is the rare exception. Indeed, perhaps
only a small handful of major "brand name" nonprofit organizations
with substantial resources, such as Human Rights Watch, the Ford
Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and a few
others, can mobilize publics and attract their own followers, thereby
accruing their own soft power. Most nonprofit organizations,
however, especially smaller and less well-known funders acting
abroad, directly contribute to the goodwill and attractiveness of their
home governments based on the national affiliation of grantors.
Simply put, when an American foundation gives money for a
humanitarian project, beneficiaries are likely to associate the end
product as produced by "American aid," rather than narrowly as
generated by a specific foundation. For example, in the late 1970s
when U.S.-based Rotary International embarked on a campaign to
eradicate polio in the Philippines by immunizing six million Filipino
children,99 the philanthropic nature and reputation of the United
States as a whole was enhanced. Today, Accion International's
support for microfinance l°° and the Global Fund for Women's focus
on educational opportunities for girls' 01 in the world's least developed
countries accrue reputational benefits to the United States.
In fact, many of the largest and most active international
grantmakers are not particularly well-known and do not wield
substantial independent soft power. For instance, the listing of the
twenty largest international donors among U.S. private foundations
includes such unfamiliar organizations as the Freeman Foundation,
Lincy Foundation, and Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation.0
Moreover, the Foundation Center reports that the median grant
dedicated to international affairs is $50,000,03 indicating that many
grants are of such a small size that they are unlikely to generate
enough attention and visibility to create a separate brand identity for
the nonprofit donor. Accordingly, the collective efforts of little-
known and smaller foundations are more likely to create cumulative
soft power for the U.S. government rather than for those
organizations individually.
99. See Anheier & Simmons, supra note 48, at 15-16.
100. See ACCION INT'L, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at http://www.accion.
org/pdf/2004_annual-report.pdf.
101. See RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
102. See id. at 35 (citing 2002 figures).
103. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., supra note 7, at 177 (citing 2003
figures).
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Given this link, the United States, in order to fortify its soft
power, should value international philanthropy and grantmaking by
U.S. private foundations and public charities as a contributing source
to its soft power. Recent foreign public opinion trends'04 and the
lingering negative public relations effects associated with the "war on
terrorism" have diminished U.S. attractiveness and standing, and
limited its power to persuade on moral principle. °5 Thus, the United
States should pursue a variety of means to attract others because that
attraction is a form of power. Persuasion through soft power can
yield more concession, cooperation, and enduring support for desired
U.S. policy outcomes than coercion alone.' 6
As one commentator has noted, "in the old adage of catching
flies, soft power is the honey and hard power is the vinegar."'0 7 Nye
and others seem to have it right: hard power and soft power are both
essential elements of sound U.S. policy on national security.'' Our
government policies, however, must be designed in a way that does
not undercut our strategic interests, which requires taking
international philanthropy into account as a valuable component in
enhancing soft power.
Paradoxically, the contributions of nonprofit organizations to
government soft power are, in part, a direct result of the sector's
independence from government. As distinct from the state, the
nonprofit sector can leverage altruistic values without being beholden
to the government, its policies, or its geopolitical interests (which are
often advanced through hard power). As a result, not only does the
sector's independence enhance the effectiveness of its own
philanthropic efforts'0 9 (and the attendant reputational contributions
of the work), but this independence also allows nonprofits to
contribute to governmental soft power. Put differently, international
philanthropy-precisely because of its independence from the state-
104. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
105. For example, the "abuse of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib ...
[has] devalued the attractiveness of American values." Kurlantzick, supra note 68, at 421;
see also MAHBUBANI, supra note 94, at 130-34 (discussing the United States's decline in
legitimacy and moral authority attributable to the detention of accused terrorists at
Guantanamo and comparing that to the impact of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident on
China).
106. See NYE, supra note 13, at 129.
107. Louis Klarevas, W Version 2.0: Foreign Policy in the Second Bush Term, 29
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 165, 168 (2005).
108. See NYE, supra note 87, at 141 ("Soft power is crucial, but alone not sufficient.");
MAHBUBANI, supra note 94, at 196 (arguing that "[t]here must be an alignment between
the impact of American 'hard power' and 'soft power' ").
109. See Anheier & Simmons, supra note 48, at 23-24.
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offers a direct, tangible, and genuine manifestation of culture, values,
and people through action on the ground. This production of
attractive cultural values, in turn, produces benefit-in the form of
soft power-that inures to the state writ large.
II. GRANTMAKING ABROAD
Even prior to the September 11 attacks, making grants to
institutions outside of the United States was considered extremely
challenging. 110 Despite its long tradition, cross-border philanthropy
was deemed to be among the most difficult, the most time-consuming,
and the most onerous forms of grantmaking for private
foundations.1 The set of tax laws and regulations governing such
grants, in place long before September 11, provide detailed due
diligence requirements to ensure that grantmakers are thoroughly
familiar with non-U.S. recipient organizations and that grants are
used for legitimate charitable purposes. To this end, private
foundations, in particular, may choose one of two methods to
facilitate cross-border giving. First, they may employ the process of
"equivalency determination."' 12 This entails a structured assessment
of a foreign entity akin to the review conducted by the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") for domestic organizations to determine
whether the grantee is the equivalent of a U.S. public charity.
Alternatively, they may opt to exercise "expenditure
responsibility,"1 3 which involves following a strict set of rules
established by Congress requiring extra scrutiny and oversight
management. Regardless of the selected methodology, the U.S.
funder faces weighty procedural and recordkeeping requirements and
detailed oversight by grantmakers and, frequently, legal counsel
beyond the norm for traditional grants to U.S. entities.
Following September 11, the U.S. government altered the
regulatory regime regarding international philanthropy."4 Although
the tax laws governing international grantmaking remained in
force," 5 the executive branch adopted several important new
measures,, including an Executive Order permitting the indefinite
freezing of assets of entities, including charitable organizations,
110. See JOHN A. EDIE & JANE C. NOBER, BEYOND OUR BORDERS: A GUIDE TO
MAKING GRANTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002).
111. See Crimm, supra note 6, at 124.
112. See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part II.B.
115. See infra Part II.A.
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deemed to have connections with terrorism. "6  In addition, the
PATRIOT Act added penalties for providing material support to
terrorists,"7 and the Treasury Department issued a set of voluntary
guidelines outlining additional diligence measures and information
U.S. funders should collect related to overseas giving."' Although
designed as reasonable recommendations to provide added security
for the United States and its citizens, these collective actions have
created an inadvertent chill that impedes effective grantmaking in
unforeseen ways and may paradoxically decrease our collective
security. The heightened due diligence requirements in the Treasury
ATF Guidelines, although voluntary, have a coercive effect when
read in conjunction with the PATRIOT Act, the Executive Order,
and other sources of antiterrorism authority from the U.S.
government. As a result of the nonprofit sector's fear of severe
penalties and its concerns about the high stakes associated with any
potential misappropriation of charitable funds, the Treasury ATF
Guidelines are beginning to acquire quasi-legal status. 9
A. Legal Requirements for Cross-Border Grants
In order to understand the ways in which the U.S. government
has followed an approach that undermines its strategic interests with
regard to international grantmaking, it is first necessary to review the
state and structure of current tax law regulating cross-border
philanthropy. The specific legal rules governing overseas
grantmaking vary depending on the legal classification of both the
receiving charity and the grantmaking organization. The differing
legal procedures to facilitate a grant to a foreign organization-each
with administrative, recordkeeping, and due diligence requirements-
depend on whether the foreign grant recipient is recognized by the
IRS, as well as the legal status of the U.S. grantmaking entity as either
a public charity or a private foundation under U.S. law.
116. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
118. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19.
119. See Press Release, Nat'l Comm. for Responsive Philanthropy, Philanthropic
Grantmaking Institutions Must Refrain from Placing Inappropriate, Ineffective, and
Unnecessary Responsibilities for Anti-Terrorism Enforcement onto the Shoulders of
Nonprofit Grant Recipients (June 28, 2005), available at http://www.ncrp.org/anti-
terrorism.asp (noting that some funders have "overreacted to the [Guidelines]" and treat
them as "mandatory").
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1. Grants by Public Charities and Private Foundations to Foreign
Organizations Recognized by the Internal Revenue Service
Procedurally, the least onerous method for a U.S. funder, either
a public charity or a private foundation, to support a foreign entity
requires the foreign charitable organization to apply to the IRS for
recognition of exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 2 ° A foreign organization receiving such recognition
from the IRS becomes eligible to receive grants from both U.S. public
charities and private foundations on the same basis as U.S.-based
recipient organizations with a determination letter from the IRS.'
While legally permitted to do so, most foreign charities in
practice do not apply for IRS determination letters. 22 Although this
procedure may ease burdens for the U.S. grantmaker, it places
substantial burdens on the foreign grant recipient. The legal costs,
administrative burdens, and language barriers associated with
applying for 501(c)(3) recognition, as well as the fees connected with
the continuing reporting requirements necessary to maintain exempt
status, serve as significant deterrents, especially for smaller foreign
organizations." 3 As a result, for most overseas grantmaking, both
U.S. public charities and private foundations must rely on an
alternative set of rules governing contributions to organizations that
are not recognized by the IRS. I first examine the rules applicable to
public charities giving abroad and then turn to private foundations
making donations overseas.
2. Grants by Public Charities to Foreign Organizations
Public charities enjoy greater freedom to operate and make
grants abroad than do private foundations. Public charities seeking to
engage in foreign activities may choose either to establish and
manage their own programs abroad or to make grants to foreign
organizations.124 In order to ensure that the public charity's donors
maintain deductibility for any contributions directed to the foreign
entity, a public charity's governing board must make certain that any
120. See Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-46 I.R.B. 34 ("Private foundations generally want their
grants to foreign grantees to be treated as qualifying distributions for purposes of section
4942 of the Internal Revenue Code .... This treatment is assured if the foreign grantee
has a[n IRS] ruling or determination letter .. "); EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 8.
121. See FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS § 36.03[2] (2003).
122. See EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 8.
123. See id.; Crimm, supra note 6, at 75.
124. See Rev. Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231.
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funds it donates to a foreign organization are used for charitable
purposes.125 Generally, with any grant made to an organization with
an IRS determination letter recognizing exempt status, a charitable
purpose is presumed.126 Otherwise, including instances when foreign
charities not recognized by the IRS receive grant funds from a public
charity, the grantor carries the burden of proving the grant was made
in furtherance of an exempt purpose.127 This requirement can be
satisfied by demonstrating that the grant was made freely, without
control either by the foreign beneficiary or by donors earmarking the
distribution. 28 Accordingly, a U.S. public charity must be able to
prove-upon IRS audit-that the charity maintained adequate
discretion and control over the grant funds.129
3. Grants by Private Foundations to Foreign Organizations
Private foundations may choose to be involved in international
philanthropy either by making direct cross-border grants to
organizations overseas or through indirect support to U.S.-based
organizations with operations abroad. Some foundations, seeking
fewer administrative requirements, choose the indirect route-
providing "international" support through gifts to a U.S.-recognized
or U.S.-based organization with special expertise implementing
programs outside of the United States. 13
However, many foundations active in global philanthropy seek to
offer direct support to projects and organizations of their own
choosing that are not recognized by the IRS or organized under U.S.
law. In such circumstances, to make direct grants to foreign
organizations and avoid being subject to certain federal excise taxes,
125. See EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 20.
126. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 121, § 36.03[2].
127. Cf Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210 (finding that an organization will not
jeopardize its 501(c)(3) status by distributing funds to a nonexempt organization so long as
it retains control over the funds and discretion over their use).
128. See Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79.
129. See Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210; EDIE &
NOBER, supra note 110, at 20.
130. For example, organizations such as Give2Asia, the Global Fund for Children, and
the International Youth Foundation serve as financial intermediaries receiving gifts from
individual donors, corporations, and foundations to regrant funds abroad. See
GIVE2ASIA, SOLUTIONS FOR GIVING TO ASIA, available at http://www.give2asia.org/pdfs/
brochure.pdf; GLOBAL FUND FOR CHILDREN, ANNUAL REPORT AND RESOURCE GUIDE
2004-2005 (2005), available at http://www.globalfundforchildren.org/pdfs/GFCAnnual
_Report04-05.pdf; INT'L YOUTH FOUND., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.iyfnet.org/uploads/2004IYFar.pdf; see also EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at
4.
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the foundations must elect to follow one of two procedural processes:
(1) equivalency determination or (2) expenditure responsibility. 31
Using the equivalency determination process permits a private
foundation to make a grant to a foreign organization, without adverse
tax consequences, after making a determination that the foreign
charity is the "equivalent" of a U.S. public charity.'3 2 The test for
equivalency demands strict adherence to the detailed standards
applicable to § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and does not
provide any flexibility to adjust to alternative cultural or legal
structures. In other words, equivalency in this context does not mean
"roughly comparable" based on the social organization or the
national, local, or customary laws of the foreign country. Rather, the
foreign organization must meet the rigid requirements of
§ 501(c)(3).33 and be deemed a public charity under § 509(a), 134
including being organized and operated exclusively for purposes
described in § 501(c)(3); 13 5 meet the prohibitions against private
inurement, substantial legislative activities, and political campaign
intervention;'36 and satisfy certain tests concerning the grantee's
sources of support. 37
Such a determination may be made by relying on a written
opinion of legal counsel establishing that the foreign organization
meets the relevant tests to be deemed a public charity equivalent, or
the grantor may make its own determination without the assistance of
counsel based on information provided by the foreign grantee in a
written affidavit.'38 The process of determining that a foreign
organization is equivalent to a public charity, however, is often time-
consuming and expensive. Determining that a foreign charity is
equivalent to either a U.S.-based public charity or a private
foundation requires a detailed analysis of organizational documents,
131. See I.R.C. § 4945(d) (2000).
132. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(5) (as amended in 1973).
133. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1972).
134. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(5) (as amended in 1973).
135. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (requiring that a charitable entity be "organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes").
136. See id. (stating that a corporation is exempt from taxation if "no part of the net
earnings of [the corporation] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of [the corporation] is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... and [the corporation] does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office").
137. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(2).
138. See Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-46 I.R.B. 34.
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financial records, and applicable foreign law, which may often require
translation into English.'39 Generally, whether an organization relies
on an opinion of legal counsel or its own determination process, in
practice, a detailed grantee affidavit is required.'4 °
Alternatively, a U.S. private foundation seeking to grant funds
abroad may elect to follow a specific set of oversight and monitoring
procedures with regard to the grant known as expenditure
responsibility.'41 The expenditure responsibility rules involve the
following steps:
* the grantor must conduct a pre-grant inquiry to
determine whether the proposed grantee is reasonably
likely to use the grant for the specified purposes;'42
* the grantor and grantee must sign a written grant
agreement with specific terms;143
* the grantee must maintain the grant funds in a segregated
bank account;1"
* the grantee must submit a written progress report to the
grantor at least once a year during the term of the grant
139. See id. For example, in order to establish public charity equivalency, many
organizations must demonstrate that they would pass the mathematical public support
test, which requires the analysis of at least four years of financial statements. See Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.170A-9(e)(2), (e)(4)(i) (as amended in 2002).
140. A qualified affidavit, which must be written in English, see Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-
46 I.R.B. 34, contains certain detailed information and representations similar to what a
U.S. nonprofit would include on its application for recognition of exemption (Form 1023)
and its annual information return (Form 990). See EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 28.
For instance, the affidavit requires a description of the organization's past and future
activities, copies of its charter, bylaws, or other relevant documents, representations that
the organization does not permit private inurement, substantial lobbying, or political
intervention, information regarding distribution of assets upon dissolution, and detailed
financial information for some types of organizations. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-46 I.R.B. 34.
Foreign organizations relying on the mathematical public support tests for public charity
equivalency, which include most foreign grant recipients other than certain religious
organizations, formal educational institutions, and certain medical institutions, must
provide information regarding the sources and levels of their gifts, grants, and
contributions from all sources, membership fees, and other income covering a period of
four consecutive fiscal years so that the grantor or the legal counsel can determine that the
grantee meets the tests detailed in I.R.C. § 509(a)(2). Id. In addition, the affidavit must
be regularly updated. Id.
141. See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4)(B).
142. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(2) (as amended in 1973).
143. See Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4945-5(b)(3), (b)(5) (as amended in 1973). The agreement
must specify the charitable purposes of the grant and commit the grant recipient to repay
funds not used for the grant's purpose, to submit annual reports, to maintain books and
records available to the grantor, and not to use the funds for lobbying, political campaign
activities, or other noncharitable purposes. See id.
144. See Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4945-5(c)(3)(ii), 53.4945-6(c)(2) (as amended in 1973).
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indicating how funds are used, progress toward grant
goals, and compliance with grant terms;145 and
the grantor must report each expenditure responsibility
grant on its annual Form 990-PF filed with the IRS as
long as grantee reports are required. 46
B. The New Legal Environment After September 11
After the September 11 attacks, the federal government pursued
a variety of policy responses intended to protect America and its
allies from future attacks. A campaign to curtail the financing of
terrorist groups, including funds channeled through charities,
emerged as a top government priority. 47  As a result, several new
tools were added to the government's arsenal to address terrorist
financing, notably Executive Order 13,224, the USA PATRIOT Act,
and the Treasury ATF Guidelines, all of which affect philanthropic
organizations engaged in overseas giving. In addition, Congress has
considered a variety of other proposals directly addressing terrorist
financing or otherwise affecting the ability of certain U.S. funders to
engage in overseas grantmaking. 41 These policies were surely
145. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (as amended in 1973).
146. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(d) (as amended in 1973). The reports must contain
the name and address of the grant recipient, the date and amount of the grant, a
description of the purpose of the grant, the amount expended by the grantee, disclosures
regarding any diversions of the funds, dates of reports received from the grant recipient,
and the date and results of any verification of grantee reports. See id.
147. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also President's Radio Address, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1397 (Sept. 29, 2001), available at http://www.gpo access.gov/
wcomp/v37no40.html ("We have also launched a strike against the financial foundation of
the global terror network. Our goal is to deny terrorists the money they need to carry out
their plans. We began by identifying 27 terrorist organizations, terrorist leaders, and
foreign businesses and charities that support or front for terrorism.").
148. See H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. §§ 314(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2004) (granting the Secretary
of Treasury authority to adopt regulations to create procedures for cooperation and
information sharing among financial institutions focusing on "matters specifically related
to the finances of terrorist groups... [that] transfer funds ... through the use of charitable
organizations, nonprofit organizations and nongovernmental organizations"). Also, as
recently as 2005, the U.S. Senate passed a bill placing restrictions on donor-advised funds
(a type of U.S. public charity) that would, among other things, limit such funds to
providing grants to only those foreign nonprofit organizations approved by the IRS. See
Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 331 (2005). For more on donor-advised
funds, see Malvin E. Bank, Community Foundations: Are 'Donor-Directed' Funds New
Vehicles for Utilizing Community Foundations?, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 42 (1993);
Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past, Present, and Future,
29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471, 528 (2005). Specifically, the provision, which was included
in the Senate-passed tax relief bill, prohibits grants from a donor-advised fund to any
entity not described in § 170(b)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. S. 2020, 109th Cong.
§ 331(e)(1)(A)(i). Due to the fact that only a small number of foreign charitable
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implemented to create a regulatory regime that would enhance
national security, but through their effects on U.S. public charities
and private foundations that work closely with foreign organizations,
they have changed the security calculus in unintended ways.
Ironically, in the years following September 11, international
philanthropy has become both more necessary and more difficult
than ever before.
1. Executive Order 13,224
Within days of the September 11 attacks, President Bush signed
Executive Order 13,224, which declared a national emergency and
imposed economic sanctions under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977 ("IEEPA"). 149 The Executive Order
blocks property and property interests in the United States of persons
and entities listed in the annex of the order. 5 ' These are foreign
persons and entities the Secretary of State determines pose risks of
committing acts of terrorism; persons and entities the Secretary of
Treasury determines assist, sponsor, or provide support for acts of
terrorism or for people on the annex list; or persons deemed to be
owned or controlled by or who act on behalf of, or otherwise
associate with, the aforementioned. 5' Furthermore, Executive Order
13,224 prohibits U.S. persons or entities from making contributions of
funds, goods, or services for the benefit of those subject to the
Executive Order or so designated as subject to the order at a later
date. 52
organizations seek or receive an IRS determination of their status under § 170(b)(1)(A),
see EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 8, this provision, if passed, would substantially alter
the ability and flexibility to use donor-advised assets to make grants to NGOs organized
outside the United States. It seems unclear whether the donor-advised funds could use
processes currently used by private foundations to determine that foreign NGOs are
equivalent to § 170(b)(1)(A) organizations, but even if such an option were available it
seems unlikely that the donor-advised funds or their clients would undertake the expense
associated with doing so. My point here is that such a change would impact overseas
grantmaking, and perhaps an assessment of the security tradeoffs would impact a
determination regarding whether such a shift is warranted or beneficial, but currently such
an analysis or debate does not appear to have occurred. In this case, neither the security
costs nor the benefits connected with the policy proposal seem to be on the table.
149. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (2000)); see
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). For a more detailed
discussion of the presidential emergency powers and terrorism-support laws, see Robert
M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4-21 (2005).
150. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
151. See id.
152. See id.
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The Executive Order authorizes the federal government to
freeze the assets of anyone associated with terrorism, including
charitable organizations that may have knowingly or unwittingly
provided support to or associated with a terrorist organization.153 The
Executive Order does not require that a person or charitable
organization that may be charged have any knowledge or intent in
order to block their assets. 154 Therefore, assets can be frozen without
any showing or allegation that the individual or entity violated any
law. Professor David Cole has argued that this approach permits
punishment based on guilt by association.155 Perhaps intended to stop
prohibited transfers, the laws in practice make it not just a crime to
support terrorist activity, but also to support any group blacklisted as
a terrorist group. Moreover, nonprofits are concerned that
challenging a designation is extremely difficult because the federal
government can deny blocked entities sufficient notice, an adversarial
hearing on the underlying merits, and access to classified evidence
used to justify the government's actions.'56
2. The USA PATRIOT Act
Supported by an overwhelming majority in Congress and signed
into law by President Bush in October 2001, the PATRIOT Act
contains a variety of measures intended to strengthen the federal
government's ability to obstruct terrorism. Most relevant to
international grantmaking, the Act increases criminal sanctions and
permits civil actions against U.S. organizations that knowingly or
intentionally provide material support for terrorism or terrorist
organizations. 157
153. See id.
154. For a more detailed history of the use of economic sanctions against terrorist
organizations and Executive Order 13,224, see Nina Crimm, High Alert: The
Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors,
Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1341, 1354-73 (2004).
155. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 58-64 (2003); David Cole,
The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). See generally David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs,
Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203.
156. See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the "Designated": The Process That Is
Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387 (2005) (arguing that the
courts and Congress have permitted the executive branch to strip charities of due process
protections under the guise of fighting terrorism).
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
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The Act defines material support broadly to include charitable
grants, microfinance loans, and technical assistance.158 Although the
Act requires a knowing or intentional violation,159 philanthropic
organizations are concerned that, despite their best efforts to develop
procedures to prevent inadvertently supporting a terrorist
organization, if their grants can be linked to such an organization or
person, they may be found to have knowingly or intentionally
provided material support.1
60
Such concerns may be reasonable for organizations operating in
less-developed parts of the world. For example, organizations
engaged in large-scale regranting may be especially vulnerable.
Suppose a U.S. private foundation makes a grant to a foreign
organization working in Africa for the purpose of promoting
community-based entrepreneurship and development through
microfinance .162 The foreign grant recipient receives a single large
grant (perhaps of $500,000) and then redistributes funds to local
individuals or community cooperatives (in small amounts of
approximately $250 to $750) to assist them in starting their own small
businesses. What if a handful of the several thousand small grants
reach the wrong hands?
Or, suppose an organization providing humanitarian aid in a war-
torn or politically unstable region finds it necessary to interact with or
offer goods to a group with questionable ties (or even a U.S.
government-designated terrorist organization) in order to ensure that
158. See id. § 2339A(b) (defining material support).
159. See id. § 2339A(a).
160. See Jones, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that nonprofits fear false accusations of
making grants to support terrorism).
161. Foundations making grants in foreign countries sometimes work with local foreign
grantmaking organizations because those groups often have better access to information
about which projects are most likely to be helpful or effective, or they are better able to
administer programs. Under this structure, a foundation makes a grant to a local entity
(the initial grantee) that in turn regrants the funds to other smaller local organizations or
individuals (the secondary grantees).
162. Frequently operated in developing countries, microfinance programs provide
financial services to low-income people without access to traditional forms of capital and
credit. Generally, microfinance programs combine small loans with business
education/counseling to support entrepreneurial business enterprises and alleviate
poverty. Examples could include small retail kiosks, sewing workshops, carpentry shops,
and market stalls. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and
Financial Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 271 (2004); Lucie E. White, Feminist
Microenterprise: Vindicating the Rights of Women in the New Global Order?, 50 ME. L.
REv. 327 (1998).
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aid trucks are not destroyed en route to the needy. 63 These are
genuine areas of concern for U.S. funders active in the developing
world where grantmaking is complex and precarious.
3. The Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines for Charities
Most regulations and guidelines concerning nonprofit
organizations are issued by the IRS. However, in November 2002,
the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control released the U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based
Charities to assist nonprofit organizations engaged in international
philanthropy. 1"M The Treasury ATF Guidelines outline procedures
for governance, disclosure and transparency in governance and
finances, financial practices and accountability, and antiterrorist
financing procedures. The Treasury Department revised and updated
the Guidelines in December 2005165 and September 2006.166
The official name given by the Treasury Department seems to
belie the status of the Guidelines. Commentators have noted that the
Treasury ATF Guidelines are referred to as "best practices," but they
actually represent a variety of new practices introduced by the
Treasury Department that were never consistent with common
practice in the nonprofit sector. As the Council on Foundations
notes, "There is no consensus within the charitable sector as to what
constitutes 'best practices"' regarding international grantmaking
163. For instance, in Sri Lanka, U.S. funders provide charitable support to people in
geographic regions "controlled by the Tamil Tigers, a named terrorist organization.
Trucks delivering [aid] cannot drive on roads controlled by the Tigers without at least
their implicit permission." Barnett F. Baron, Deterring Donors: Anti-Terrorist Financing
Rules and American Philanthropy, INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Jan. 2004, at 12, available
at http://www.icnl.org/JOURNAL/vol6iss2/arbaron.htm; see also Sally Buzbee, Warlords
Hold Unity at Gunpoint: Old Ways Pose New Dangers, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Jan. 9, 2002, at A6 (noting the practice of regional Afghan warlords exacting bribes from
foreign aid trucks for safe passage).
164. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter ORIGINAL ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING
GUIDELINES].
165. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2005) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter 2005 REVISED ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING
GUIDELINES].
166. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19.
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activity. 16 Practices in the field vary according to the type, size, and
resources of the grantmaking organization. The Treasury ATF
Guidelines fail to account for these differences, and, in many respects,
the Guidelines recommend practices far more exhaustive than those
previously employed by international funders.
Interestingly, the Treasury ATF Guidelines do not have the force
of law and impose no penalties for failure to comply. Conversely,
compliance with the Guidelines does not provide immunity from
asset blocking under the Executive Order or prosecution under the
PATRIOT Act. Despite their formal status as non-law, the
Guidelines continue to receive significant deference in the field from
nonprofit managers and their advisers. This is not because the sector
views the Guidelines as likely to help prevent funds from being
diverted to terrorists, but because it feels coerced. 6  The effect of the
government's current regulatory approach-combining unclear
voluntary rules with the uncertainty stemming from the possibility
that the U.S. government may hold charitable organizations
accountable for unknowingly funding terrorism169-has led to
overcompliance by funders. 170 In part because they were issued by a
government agency with the ability to freeze assets, the Treasury
ATF Guidelines, despite their designation as "voluntary," are
beginning to acquire quasi-legal status. 171 Even nonbinding guidelines
can exercise a degree of constraint on certain activities when
promulgated by a powerful government agency. Operating as they do
against the backdrop of the PATRIOT Act and the Executive Order,
167. See Letter from Dorothy S. Ridings, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Council on Founds., to David Aufhauser, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (June
20, 2003) [hereinafter Council on Foundations Letter], available at http://www.cof.org/
files/documents/legal/treasury comments 06.03.pdf. The Council on Foundations is a
national membership organization of grantmakers promoting philanthropy.
168. Editorial, Charity Screening. Post-9-11 Rules Could Stifle Legitimate Giving,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 8, 2004, at A8 ("Though the [Treasury ATF G]uidelines are
voluntary, foundations fear retribution from the government for not complying-
especially since the executive order implies culpability for even unknowingly passing along
funds that end up being used by an organization that aids terrorist causes.").
169. See Tamara Audi, Charities Do Detective Work in War on Terror: They Scour
Watch Lists To See If Grant Recipients Turn Up, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 6, 2004, at
Al ("Foundations fear that even an unintentional or indirect link to a terror group could
ruin their reputations and cause the federal government to freeze assets.").
170. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (arguing that uncertain
legal standards deter activities that may bestow social benefits).
171. See Press Release, Nat'l Comm. for Responsive Philanthropy, supra note 119
(noting that some funders have "overreacted to the [Guidelines]" and treat them as
"mandatory"); Editorial, supra note 168.
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the Treasury ATF Guidelines manage to conflate recommended
practices with regulation. The quasi-legal status of these Guidelines
has been bolstered by the fact that the Treasury Department has
stated in the Federal Register that charities, at "a minimum, should
follow the U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S. Based Charities."'72
This perception of the Guidelines as an integral part of the
regulatory apparatus governing international philanthropy is a
widely-held view. Even senior Treasury Department officials have
acknowledged and informed Congress that the Treasury ATF
Guidelines are being treated as more than just voluntary
recommendations. In his 2004 Senate confirmation hearings, Juan C.
Zarate, who was subsequently confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
Terrorism Financing at the Treasury Department, stated that "the
guidelines.., frankly have been treated as regulatory guidance by the
charities." '173
Moreover, despite their title, the Treasury ATF Guidelines do
not merely suggest procedures commonly employed by experienced
foundations attempting to follow existing law regarding overseas
giving.174 Rather, they proffer several new administrative tasks that,
to a great extent, pressure charitable organizations to engage in
efforts to ferret out potential terrorist activity. Many of the
recommendations are burdensome and severely impact the
independence, operations, and interactions of U.S.-based nonprofit
organizations.'75 Although the government may certainly encourage
citizens to remain vigilant and watchful to prevent terrorist activity,
citizens (individuals or entities) should not be tasked with
intelligence-gathering duties more appropriate for the U.S.
government. 176 As one of the largest associations of nonprofits has
written, "Almost without exception, the grantmaking community
172. Solicitation of Federal Civilian and Uniformed Service Personnel for
Contributions to Private Voluntary Organizations-Sanctions Compliance Certification,
70 Fed. Reg. 67,339, 67,340 (Nov. 7, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 950).
173. Nominations of John 0. Colvin, Stuart Levey, and Juan C. Zarate: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the
Treasury), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/95478.pdf.
174. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part III.A.
176. See infra Part III.B.
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
finds the Voluntary Guidelines unproductive, unrealistic and
detached from the real-life experiences of the charitable sector." '177
4. Cases of U.S. Charity-Terrorist Connections
Naturally, any effective prescription to resolve a problem
requires a clear understanding and diagnosis of the actual abuses. An
understanding of the facts and circumstances of the cases of alleged
charitable abuses by terrorists provides significant guidance and a
starting point for operating assumptions. Although policymakers
always need to consider new risks and new abuses, a review of the
available evidence regarding actual cases and patterns presented by
past cases may inform decisionmaking on whether the current
regulatory regime is working to protect security interests.
The government's approach, especially the Treasury ATF
Guidelines, is clearly intended to provide mechanisms to prevent
grants made by legitimate U.S. charitable organizations to foreign
organizations from being inadvertently diverted to terrorist purposes,
what I call "indirect charitable abuse." Significantly, however,
neither the government nor the charitable sector itself has reported
such cases of diversion. 17 8 Instead, the paradigmatic cases, if anything,
suggest concerns about "direct charitable abuse," in which senior
officers and directors of U.S. charities purposefully engage in
deceptive fundraising, primarily from individuals, and then knowingly
use the funds for noncharitable purposes.179 Since September 11, the
federal government has frozen the assets of five U.S.-based charities
it suspected of funneling money to terrorists: the Global Relief
Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, the Holy
177. See Grantmakers Without Borders, Post 9-11 Grantmaking: Anti-Terrorism
Policies and International Grantmaking, http://www.gwob.net/advicegm/911.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007).
178. See Victoria B. Bjorklund et al., Terrorism and Money Laundering: Illegal
Purposes and Activities, 25 PACE L. REV. 233, 234 (2005) (noting that "if such diversions
have been undertaken by U.S. donors or charities ... the activities have been hidden and
not well known to the charitable sector.... [Such diversion] is beyond the experience of
almost all U.S. charities....").
179. See id. at 239. Experts studying terrorist financing have determined that terrorists
committed to laundering money through charities may attempt to use several different
means, including the raising of funds through legitimate charities using formal fundraising,
raising funds through informal cash collections, transferring funds through charities to
terrorist groups, and establishing charities as direct covers for terrorist organizations. See
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST
FINANCING TYPOLOGIES 2004-2005 (2005), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/
16/8/35003256.pdf; see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170-71 (describing
how al Qaeda used corrupt charities to provide financial support for its operations).
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Land Foundation, the Islamic American Relief Agency, and
KindHearts. 18 °  Each of these cases allegedly involves direct
charitable abuse.
Furthermore, each of the five cases involves Muslim charities.
All nonprofits, however, remain at risk. Two of the charities-the
Global Relief Foundation 8' and the Benevolence International
Foundation182-were alleged to have connections to Osama Bin
180. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
181. In December 2001, the Treasury Department froze and seized the assets of the
Global Relief Foundation ("GRF") pending investigation into its ties to terrorism. See
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784-85 (N.D. Il. 2002).
Founded in 1992 as a U.S. public charity and headquartered in Illinois, GRF was
organized to provide humanitarian relief to Muslims overseas, primarily in war-torn
regions such as Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Chechnya. See JOHN ROTH
ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON
TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 88-89 (2004), available at
http://www.9-llcommission.gov/staff-statements/911 _TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
The U.S. government alleged that the founders of GRF were formerly associated
with Osama Bin Laden through an organization Bin Laden co-founded prior to al Qaeda
for the recruitment and financial aid of mujahideen (resistance fighters) fighting the
Soviets in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s. See Bjorklund et al., supra note 178, at 235.
Although the FBI determined that GRF distributed substantial funds for humanitarian
relief, the agency also believed that GRF supported terrorists by acquiring and shipping
"large quantities of sophisticated communications equipment, [providing] humanitarian
cover documentation to suspected terrorists and fund-raising for terrorist groups under
the cover of humanitarian relief." ROTH ET AL., supra, at 91. In October 2002, GRF was
designated a specially designated global terrorist ("SDGT") by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control ("OFAC"), a division of the Department of the Treasury, pursuant to
Executive Order 13,224. See Additional Designations of Terrorism-Related Blocked
Persons, 68 Fed. Reg. 399, 400 (Jan. 3, 2003).
182. Founded in 1992, Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF"), a U.S. public
charity, described its mission as "relieving .the suffering of Muslims around the world."
See ROTH ET AL., supra note 181, at 94-95. BIF's major programmatic activities included
support for health initiatives, orphan sponsorship, and refugee aid to Muslims in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, China, Pakistan, and Russia. See Matthew J. Piers, Malevolent
Destruction of a Muslim Charity: A Commentary on the Prosecution of Benevolence
International Foundation, 25 PACE L. REV. 339, 344 (2005).
BIF's founding board of directors included Sheikh Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee.
See ROTH ET AL., supra note 181, at 94-95. According to the U.S. government, Batterjee
was also "affiliated with a group of wealthy donors from the Persian Gulf region" that
provided support to resistance fighters in Afghanistan under the leadership of Bin Laden
in the 1980s (an effort supported by the U.S. government). Id. at 94; see also Lisa Getter
et al., Islamic American Nonprofits Face Increased Scrutiny in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2001, at Al. In 1993, one year after its creation, the original directors were replaced by
three new directors, and Enaam Arnaout became the new executive director. See ROTH
ET AL., supra note 181, at 94-95. Although Batterjee was formally removed from the
board, the U.S. government contended that Arnaout allowed Batterjee to dominate
operations from behind the scenes. Id.
In 2002, the FBI conducted a search of BIF's offices in Bosnia, where it reportedly
uncovered evidence of "links" between BIF's leadership, Bin Laden, and al Qaeda. See id.
at 102. The material seized included "minutes of al Qaeda meetings, the al Qaeda oath, al
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Laden. Three of the charities-Holy Land Foundation, 83 Islamic
American Relief Agency,l" 4 and KindHearts185-allegedly maintained
ties to Hamas. 86
Qaeda organizational charts ... and letters between Arnaout and Bin Laden." Id. at 102-
03. But see Piers, supra, at 351 (explaining that Arnaout's connections to Bin Laden and al
Qaeda were tenuous and dated back to the 1980s, when both men were involved in efforts
to defeat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a goal supported by the U.S. government).
OFAC designated BIF as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 13,244. See Additional
Designations of Terrorism-Related Blocked Persons, 68 Fed. Reg. 399, 399 (Jan. 3, 2003).
Subsequently, in 2003, Arnaout was charged with criminal activity, but the indictment
contained no claims that BIF provided any funds to al Qaeda. See ROTH ET AL., supra
note 181, at 104.
Rather, the charges focused on BIF's support of Chechen and Bosnian fighters
with "fraudulently solicited and obtained donations by falsely representing that the funds
would be used solely for humanitarian purposes." Id. Arnaout pled guilty to one count of
racketeering conspiracy for fraudulent diversion of $315,624 in charitable donations by
providing tents, boots, medical supplies, and other similar resources to overseas
combatants in Chechnya and troops in Bosnia. See id. at 108. While this constitutes a
misuse of charitable funds, it did not amount to supporting terrorism because neither the
Bosnian Army nor the Chechen separatists who benefited from the BIF supplies were
considered terrorists by the U.S. government. See Current Situation and Future of
Chechnya: Hearing Before the U.S. Comm'n on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
108th Cong. 5 (2003) (statement of Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State) ("[W]e do not share the
Russian assessment that the Chechen conflict is simply and solely a counterterrorism
effort. We think it is a much more complex question. While there are terrorist elements
fighting in Chechnya, we do not agree that all separatists can be equated as terrorists.");
Congress Funds Bosnia Mission, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1995, at Al;
Elizabeth Sullivan, Fears of New Danger Rise amid Hopes for Peace, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 2, 1995, at A5.
Although Arnaout was sentenced to more than eleven years, the court rejected
the government's request to apply sentencing enhancement for crimes of terrorism
because "Arnaout does not stand convicted of a terrorism offense. Nor does the record
reflect that he attempted, participated in, or conspired to commit any act of terrorism."
United States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
183. Once one of the largest Muslim charities in the United States, the Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF"), a Texas-based public charity in
operation for more than a decade, was established to provide aid to Palestinian Muslims in
Israel and other parts of the Middle East. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2002). Pursuant to Executive Order 13,224,
OFAC designated HLF as an SDGT based on its alleged "acts for or on behalf of" Hamas
in December 2001. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004). The U.S. government contends that
HLF has funneled more than $12 million to Hamas-controlled entities and other
Palestinian organizations that the United States considers sponsors of terrorism. See Toni
Heinzl, Indictment: Group Aided Terrorists; Holy Land Foundation Sent Millions to
Hamas, Feds Say, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 28, 2004, at Al.
However, Muslim advocates have challenged the government's characterization
and argue that HLF's challenged donations, made to various local "zakat" committees
throughout the West Bank and Gaza, were legitimate. See Laila Al-Marayati, American
Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321, 324-25 (2005).
HLF's defenders claim that the committees are local grassroots entities that include
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community leaders of various social and political affiliations, including the region's ruling
political party (Hamas) and insist that HLF's humanitarian grants were not directed to
Hamas, even if some individuals associated with grantees may also have ties to Hamas. Id.
None of the zakat committees were designated as terrorist groups by the United States.
As a result of the designation, however, HLF ceased its operations in 2001. See Heinzl,
supra.
184. In October 2004, the Treasury Department designated the Islamic American
Relief Agency ("IARA"), based in Columbia, Missouri, an SDGT and blocked the
organization's assets. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.
Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2005). Recognized as an exempt organization by the IRS in 1985,
IARA operated for more than nineteen years providing "charitable and humanitarian aid
to refugees, orphans, victims of human and natural disasters, and other poor and needy
persons and entities throughout the world, without regard to faith or political affiliation."
Id. IARA was originally founded under the name Islamic African Relief Agency, but the
organization changed its name when it began expanding its charitable activities beyond the
continental borders of Africa. Id.
The Treasury Department has alleged that IARA and its senior officers
maintained ties to both Hamas and the Islamic African Relief Agency of Sudan. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Global Network, Senior
Officials of IARA for Supporting bin Laden, Others (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2025.htm. IARA claimed that it did not support
terrorism and had no connection to the Sudanese organization with the similar name. See
Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 40. Despite IARA's protestations, the U.S.
district court upheld the. Treasury Department's designation based upon its review of
unclassified and classified information, much of which was not made available to IARA,
determining that "the agency's decision to block the IARA-USA's assets was not arbitrary
and capricious, but ... supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 45. As a result of the
government designation, IARA has ceased operations. See Peter Shinkle, Case Shines
Light on Columbia, Mo., ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24,2005, at B1.
185. On February 19, 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury froze the assets and
blocked all property interests of KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development,
Inc. ("KindHearts"), a Toledo, Ohio-based nonprofit organization. See Cary Spivak &
Dan Bice, Questions Arise About Muslim Scholar, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 19,
2006, at A2. Founded in 2002 after Treasury designated some of the nation's largest
Muslim charities supporters of terrorism, KindHearts quickly became a prominent U.S.
Muslim charity, raising more than $5 million by 2004 and distributing grants to Lebanon,
Pakistan, and Gaza and the West Bank. See Amanda Garrett, Muslim Charity Drawing
Scrutiny; Group with Ohio Ties Denies Terror Connection, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Dec. 6, 2005, at Al.
The Treasury Department has claimed that KindHearts contributed funds to
Hamas, including more than $250,000 to the Lebanon-based SDGT Sanabil. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Freezes Assets of Organization Tied to
Hamas (Feb. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/s4058.htm.
Although KindHearts was not designated an SDGT as of the publication of this Article,
pursuant to the Executive Order its assets have been blocked pending an investigation
.that has effectively closed the organization's operations and prevented the millions of
dollars in contributions from reaching their intended recipients-humanitarian projects in
the developing Muslim world.
186. Hamas is a Palestinian group-designated a terrorist organization by the U.S.
government-accused of dozens of suicide bombing attacks in Israel. See Stephen Braun,
Texas Charity, Leaders Are Charged with Aiding Hamas, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at A8;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Shutting Down the Terrorist Financial Network
(Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po841.htm. In 2006, it
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Assuming the facts of the five cases of alleged charitable abuse
involving U.S.-based entities to be true, the story that emerges is
unconnected to the injury the Guidelines have been designed to
prevent: namely, an incident of a U.S. charity being duped by a
foreign organization that heightened diligence would have prevented.
Instead, these actual cases describe criminally motivated individuals
directly using U.S. public charities (not foreign organizations) for
noncharitable purposes in violation of law and the charities' own
representations. 18 7 Perhaps the scarcity of incidents of indirect abuse
indicates that the existing, rigorous diligence standards under federal
tax law in place prior to September 11 have been and continue to be
effective at rooting out illicit activity.188 Or, perhaps the problem of
indirect abuse is overstated.
As of the publication of this Article, none of these cases has
resulted in any terrorism-related criminal conviction, although legal
proceedings appear to have been concluded or do not appear
forthcoming in four of the five matters.'89 All that can be said is that
it is possible that some or all of the organizations may have been
associated with terrorists groups, but it is also equally possible that
they were not. Even more important for policy purposes, however,
the facts of the cases do not suggest that additional diligence by the
charitable sector would have prevented diversion of funds. Because
all of these entities were organized under U.S. law, filed with and had
all their paperwork approved by the IRS, and acquired an IRS
determination letter, the government was best positioned to uncover
these alleged charitable fronts. If the allegations are true, they all
describe, in various forms, cases of direct charitable abuse in which
illegitimate U.S. charities chose to purposefully deceive donors, an
abuse not addressed by the Treasury ATF Guidelines. Again, the
Guidelines would be relevant only to a case in which a legitimate U.S.
grantmaker makes an imprudent grant to a foreign recipient
organization engaged in illegal activities. Authors of a recent law
review article, after reviewing cases involving U.S. charities and
also became the majority ruling party of the Palestinian Authority. See Steven Erlanger,
Hamas Routs Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at
Al.
187. Even despite the reported links, investigations of GRF and BIF have not proven
that either charity provided financial support to al Qaeda after the U.S. government
designated it a terrorist organization in 1999. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 181, at 111.
188. See Bjorklund et al., supra note 178, at 244.
189. Criminal charges were filed in the HLF case and a trial date is still pending. See
Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Muslim Charity, Leaders Indicted: U.S. Says Holy Land
Foundation Funneled Money to Hamas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 28, 2004, at Al.
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terrorist connections, concluded that their research revealed no
incident "involv[ing] a diversion of funds granted by a U.S.
grantmaker to a foreign recipient organization ... where the
diversion would have been uncovered but for the lack of appropriate
due diligence and oversight procedures.' 9 °
While any allegations are troubling, notably the government has
not substantiated claims that U.S.-based nonprofits are significant
sources of terrorist financing. The evidence to date does not
demonstrate that charitable grants from legitimate U.S.-based public
charities and private foundations provide a significant source of
support for al Qaeda or terrorist activities. 91
III. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
At first glance, the post-September 11 reforms may seem benign,
modest, or even eminently reasonable. However, the charitable
sector has criticized the reforms primarily because they impose new
administrative burdens, on top of an existing regulatory regime
providing for substantial diligence, without a clear indication of how
the additional reforms-particularly the Treasury ATF Guidelines-
aid nonprofits in distinguishing between legitimate foreign charities
and illegitimate ones. Essentially, the nonprofit sector sees a
disconnect between the new regulatory regime and its articulated
purposes. The federal government, acting out of fear of further
attacks and moral outrage that charitable funds might be diverted for
terrorist uses, has pursued executive and legislative actions, including
the Treasury ATF Guidelines, since September 11 to protect and aid
U.S. charities. 92 What is lacking in the debate about administrative
costs and the speculative nature of the security benefits from
increased regulation is discussion of the security costs of the new
regulatory environment.
In particular, many of the specific guideline terms increase
burdens on what is already viewed as a cumbersome diligence
process, thereby creating a marginal chill, at least for some funders,
on international giving. Furthermore, the regulatory environment
190. Bjorklund et al., supra note 178, at 244.
191. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 181, at 4.
192. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 2 ("[T]he Guidelines are
intended to assist charities in developing ... a risk-based approach to guard against the
threat of diversion of charitable funds ... by terrorists and their support networks."). But
see Jon Frandsen, The Right Takes Aim at NGOs, 63 CQ WEEKLY 1417, 1417 (2005)
(noting that groups associated with a conservative political agenda are mobilizing "to trim
the powers of international aid, development and advocacy groups").
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
may impact the effectiveness of nonprofits in the field by changing
relationships and perceptions between foreign grantees and U.S.
grantors. Also, the government's approach has unintentionally
created incentives that skew preferences in the form in which
international aid is distributed in ways that undermine security. With
the root causes of terrorism still at issue, U.S. public diplomacy
suffering, and American soft power at stake,193 the deleterious
impacts of the various guideline requirements take on a new urgency
once understood as security costs rather than merely as
administrative burdens. So, although more diligence may or may not
lead to information reducing the likelihood that charitable funds will
inadvertently reach terrorists, the consequences of these added
requirements must be measured as part of an overall calculus of
whether the tradeoffs warrant the new regime.
A. The Chilling Effects on Nonprofits
Since the release of the original version of the Treasury ATF
Guidelines, several commentators and advocates for nonprofit
organizations engaged in international grantmaking have criticized
the Guidelines and questioned the likelihood that they will actually
impact terrorist financing, especially when the end users of the
information collected do not recognize it as valuable or useful.194 As
one commentator has noted, "Guidelines, reporting requirements,
and other obligations imposed on large populations are unlikely to be
effective.... [C]ollecting too much information means looking for a
needle in a haystack. Making the haystack bigger may complicate the
job ...."195 Many grantmakers, even those with substantial resources,
will have difficulty obtaining and analyzing much of the information
outlined in the Guidelines.
For instance, the antiterrorist financing section of the Treasury
ATF Guidelines suggests that, before any charitable funds are
distributed to a foreign recipient organization, the U.S.-based funder
should collect the names and addresses of any subcontracting
organizations working with the foreign organization and background
193. See supra Part I.
194. See Crimm, supra note 154, at 1440; Piers, supra note 182, at 352-53 ("It is hard to
see how the government's activities with regard to ... charities have had any positive
effect on targeting terrorism."); Council on Foundations Letter, supra note 167, at 8; see
also Fred Stokeld, Charitable Groups Draft Plan To Curb Terrorist Funding, 46 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 150, 150 (2004) ("Exempt organizations practitioners have ... criticized
the [Treasury ATF Guidelines] provisions they say would be burdensome .....
195. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 231.
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information about grantee board members and key staff.'9 6 The
original version of the Guidelines also directed U.S. funders to collect
information on banking affiliations of foreign grant recipients;'97
while this particular element has been removed from the modified
version of the Guidelines, the overall thrust of the exercise remains.
For U.S. charitable organizations that support a large number of
overseas organizations, this level of detail could be extensive,
especially considering that the information sought on subcontractors
extends beyond those persons directly related to the proposed grant.
Additionally, once collected, to be useful this information must be
documented, stored, and presumably analyzed by someone within the
organization. All of these activities require additional staff resources
to manage and organize. At least one commentator has observed that
the measures described in the Guidelines "would require a great
expenditure of resources on the part of the charities, something that
would be very difficult, especially for smaller organizations."'98 Also,
as U.S. grantmakers pass along the burdens of heightened
information requests to grantee recipients, groups in the developing
world suffer the consequences.199
Additionally, the Guidelines are not attuned to the realities of
the recordkeeping and information available abroad. As Barnett F.
Baron, then the executive vice president of the Asia Foundation,
observed, "The Guidelines erroneously assume that comprehensive
and detailed information about prospective grantees is generally
available and can be readily collected in the 'developing world,' just
as in the United States., 200 For example, the Guidelines provide that
funders should require copies of "official registry documents, annual
reports, and annual filings with the pertinent government. '21
Unfortunately, all too frequently in the developing world this
information either does not exist or may be considered confidential.2 2
196. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 9-12.
197. The Treasury Department originally suggested that charities should "determine
the identity of the financial institutions with which the foreign recipient organization
maintains accounts [and] ... seek bank references...." See ORIGINAL ANTI-TERRORIST
FINANCING GUIDELINES, supra note 164, at 7. This provision was removed when the
Guidelines were revised in 2005.
198. AI-Marayati, supra note 183, at 330.
199. See Stephanie Strom, Small Charities Abroad Feel Pinch of U.S. War on Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at A8 ("[G]roups in the developing world say that acquiring the
data needed to allow their benefactors to meet the standards is too onerous a task ... .
200. See Baron, supra note 163, at 10.
201. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 10.
202. See Lester M. Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.-
Aug. 1994, at 110; Adriana Ruiz-Restrepo, Active Without Recognition: Obstacles to
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Moreover, in some regions of the world, communications systems
make gathering and transmitting such information impractical. Some
overseas charitable activities occur in places where access to copy
machines, fax machines, the Internet, or even electricity is either
intermittent or nonexistent, making compliance difficult.2 3  In
addition, some foreign nonprofit organizations operate without
formal legal recognition because the benefits of official registration
are minimal, registration does not exist, registration is denied to
silence independent voices, or they prefer to remain outside the scope
of corrupt government control.204 For instance, the U.S. Department
of State has acknowledged that some governments, such as Belarus
and China, have denied registration or deregistered certain legitimate
NGOs based on their willingness to discuss human rights abuses.2 °5
China uses the registration process to control nonprofits by imposing
burdensome requirements and high fees on registration so that
entities without adequate government ties and support cannot
register.2 °6
As another example, the list checking prescribed by the
Guidelines 27 poses challenges and questions of efficacy. The original
Development of the Colombian Third Sector, INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Feb. 2005, at
17, 20, available at http://www.icnl.org/JOURNAL/vol7iss2/IJNL%20vol%207%20no%
202.pdf.
203. See Paula D. Johnson et al., Promoting Philanthropy: Global Challenges and
Approaches, in RETHINKING PHILANTHROPIC EFFECTIVENESS: LESSONS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF FOUNDATION EXPERTS, supra note 48, at 25, 27 (noting
that foreign nonprofits frequently face capacity impediments because of weaknesses in
supporting infrastructure).
204. See Kimberly Bulkley, Analysis of Nonprofit Organizations in Kazakhstan, 3 OR.
REV. INT'L L. 3, 5 (2001); Milton Cerny & Michael W. Dunham, Tsunami: NGO
Response: Now and the Future, 47 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 181, 184 (2005); Kareem
Elbayar, NGO Laws in Selected Arab States, INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Sept. 2005, at 3,
18-19, available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol7iss4/ijnl-vol7iss4.pdf; Tatshat
Stepanyan, Armenian Governmental Commission Regulating Charitable Programs, INT'L
J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Jan. 2006, at 23, 23, available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/
vol8iss2/ijnl-vol8iss2.pdf.
205. See The Essential Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
Democracy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (June 8,
2006) (statement of Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State) [hereinafter Lowenkron, Testimony Before
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2006/
68658.htm.
206. See id.
207. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 11-12 ("With respect to key
employees, members of the governing board, or other senior management at a [foreign]
grantee's [organization] ... [a U.S.] charity should assure itself that none of these
individuals is subject to OFAC sanctions.... Charities should be aware that other nations
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version of the Guidelines called upon U.S. charities to verify that
potential foreign grantees and their affiliates, as well as the people
associated with them, such as their board members and senior staff,
were not on any of the various terrorist watch lists maintained by the
U.S. government, the United Nations, or the European Union.2 °8
Although the revised version of the Guidelines no longer asks U.S.
domestic nonprofits to consult as many lists, it still calls for checking
against the U.S. lists. 209 Several problems remain with relying on such
lists-even the OFAC master list of Specially Designated Nationals-
for use by the general public. The watch lists are long and many of
the names on them are so generic (equivalent to "John Smith" in
certain foreign countries) that they fail to provide sufficient detailed
assistance to narrow down the identity of individuals with whom to
avoid dealings.210 In addition, innocent persons frequently appear on
such lists, either by error or because they share names with nefarious
persons.211  Because the watch lists continually change, some
foundations have developed timely and costly procedures under
which multiple lists are checked on a daily basis.212 Of course, even if
lists are checked regularly, clever terrorists intent on duping
unknowing charities would likely attempt to thwart the watch list
system by changing names or using assumed identities to avoid
detection. Accordingly, the list checking carries significant financial
and staffing burdens. By pushing U.S. charities and foundations to
rely on these watch lists, "substantial cultural, political, and economic
costs, in both the short and long term, 213 are levied against nonprofits
may have their own lists of designated terrorist-related individuals, entities, or
organizations .... ).
208. See ORIGINAL ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES, supra note 164, at 6-
7.
209. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 11-12, with ORIGINAL
ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES, supra note 164, at 6-7.
210. See Strom, supra note 199.
211. See Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(criticizing the accuracy of secret watch lists and the availability of redress measures for
individuals affected); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process,
40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3-9, 21-23 (2005) (criticizing terrorist watch lists as overbroad and
lacking a sufficient process by which those on them can review and appeal their status);
Anthony D. Romero, Editorial, You, Too, Could Be a Suspected Terrorist, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 2004, at A15.
212. See Audi, supra note 169 (noting that because of the Treasury ATF Guidelines the
Ford Foundation, which funds more than 4,000 grantees worldwide, checks every charity
against ten different watch lists each day).
213. Shane, supra note 211 (manuscript at 4).
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to the extent false positives generated by such lists burden their
charitable work.
U.S. public charities and private foundations are not the only
American entities transferring funds across borders where risks of
terrorist diversion exist. Nonetheless, the Treasury Department has
not suggested that all financial institutions, for example, collect the
names and home addresses of all board members and staff of every
foreign corporation as well as those of any subcontracting business or
organization working with the foreign corporation. 14 There are two
plausible reasons for this disparate treatment. First, there may be a
general reluctance to chill operations affecting corporate profits.
Second, in the context of multinational corporations, it may seem
intuitively obvious that the burdens of regulating all U.S. foreign
transactions in the name of defeating terrorism so far exceed any
conceivable benefits that such measures are impracticable, if not
nonsensical.
Defenders of the Guidelines might argue that they are simply
encouraging greater diligence to further reduce the chance that any
monies will reach the hands of terrorists. However, no legitimate
U.S. charity wants its charitable funds to be used for any
noncharitable purposes, especially not for terrorism, and thus both
government interests and the interests of U.S. public charities and
private foundations are aligned on this point. It does not seem clear
that the government needs to assert its authority to prevent legitimate
charities from engaging in uninformed grantmaking. In this context,
additional diligence is not purely good. Too much diligence and too
many procedural requirements can hinder or chill charitable activity
or use up resources otherwise available for philanthropy implicating
security interests.
To be sure, cross-border giving will not dry up completely as a
result of the Guidelines or the regulatory regime. However, the
administrative burdens of the Guidelines, which reach beyond the
preexisting detailed diligence requirements, encumber cross-border
giving for all U.S.-based international grantmakers and may
especially deter some funders, particularly smaller organizations,
from pursuing direct foreign giving. In fact, initial evidence seems to
214. However, the Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to have
comprehensive anti-money laundering programs to identify and report suspicious financial
transactions to the Treasury Department. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-30 (Supp. III 2003); see
also Mitchell, supra note 12, at 222-24 (discussing anti-money laundering laws in the
aftermath of September 11 and questioning the benefits in light of the private sector
costs).
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indicate that direct cross-border giving has decreased as a result of
the government's post-September 11 reforms.2 5  Even though some
funders, especially large, committed donors, can be expected to
absorb the costs associated with heightened diligence, that does not
justify the costs. Although a 2002 study of international grantmaking
activity revealed that compliance cost estimates were not readily
available,216 the costs imposed on organizations by these measures are
not insubstantial; this is especially true in light of the fact that
international philanthropy has always been considered a costly
endeavor for U.S. funders.217  The Guidelines have also been
criticized on other grounds.2 8
B. Impacts on Nonprofit Relationships and Effectiveness
Because of the Treasury ATF Guidelines, invasive background
checks on foreign nonprofit board members, employees, and
subcontractors, detailed information requests about banking
relationships, and attempts to gather information and examine data
on foreign recipient organizations' sources of income are becoming
commonplace. 219  This has had the effect of turning U.S. charitable
funders engaged in international activities into agents of the
government, effectively conscripting grantmakers into service in the
war against terrorism. Although the Guidelines do not require
nonprofit organizations to pick up arms, they do enlist philanthropic
entities to conduct intelligence gathering activities on the
government's behalf.122
215. See infra Part III.C.
216. Crimm, supra note 6, at 124 ("Not one private foundation had maintained records
from which it could discern its compliance costs ....").
217. See id. (reporting that foundations perceived international grantmaking to be
"significantly more ... financially costly than domestic grant-making").
218. For additional analysis of the original version of the Guidelines, see Crimm, supra
note 154, at 1440-46; Joseph Younker, Note, The "U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-
Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best-Practices for U.S. Based Charities":
Sawing a Leg Off the Stool of Democracy, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 865
(2004); Council on Foundations Letter, supra note 167, at 3 (noting the Guidelines contain
provisions that are "internally inconsistent and/or contrary to federal and state laws");
Memorandum from Betsy Buchalter Adler & Thomas Silk, Silk, Adler & Colvin to an
Unidentified Client 2 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.usig.org/PDFs/Treasury
GuidelinesMemo.doc (criticizing the Guidelines for seeking to impose "a federal
corporate governance standard, which conflicts with the laws of many states governing
non-profit corporations").
219. See Jones, supra note 10, at 1.
220. In congressional testimony, the then-Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Department indicated that "[tihe private sector serves as the front-line in the campaign
against terrorist financing.... [Treasury] will continue ... working with ... the charitable
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One of the key strengths of nonprofit institutions and a source of
their effectiveness stems from their independence. Because they are
neither government nor business, nonprofit organizations occupy a
unique space between the public and private sectors, unfettered from
both the constraints of the political system faced by government and
those of market ownership faced by corporations.22' Although the
sector's activities may generate advantageous and even important
byproducts for government or business,222 and some charitable
organizations frequently work directly with government or business,
nonprofits remain independent and apart from their public and
corporate sector brethren. Even the nomenclature encapsulates this
fundamental feature, as the term "nongovernmental organization,"
emphasizing such organizations' unique role apart from government,
has gained global acceptance. 23  Because of this independence,
international funders are able to use their position to bring diverse
coalitions together: foreign governments, the private sector, other
funders, and citizen stakeholders who are normally excluded from
decisionmaking processes. 2 24 Since U.S. security interests are linked
to the development of civil societies and stable states abroad, policies
exact security costs when they undermine-even marginally-the
unique contributions that American nonprofits make in advancing
overseas development. The Guidelines are contributing to the
erosion of the vital independence and separateness from government
that has been a hallmark of the nonprofit sector.
sector ... to enhance their abilities to detect and report possible terrorist financing and
money laundering activities." Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror Finance Program:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 17-18
(2004) (statement of Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the
Treasury).
221. See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY
PRIMER 1-5 (2002). Clearly nonprofits have their own set of stakeholders, but no one
group can claim exclusive ownership the way voters and shareholders stake claims over
government and business. Id. at 5.
222. For example, nonprofits aid government by providing social services that would
otherwise be provided by government or by generating soft power, and the nonprofit
sector may produce beneficial byproducts for the private sector by providing an educated
workforce or a rich arts and cultural region to attract employees.
223. See Rubem Cesar Fernandes, Threads of Planetary Citizenship, in CITIZENS
STRENGTHENING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 319, 332 (Miguel Darcy de Oliveria & Rajesh
Tandon eds., 1994) ("The expression nongovernmental organization comes originally from
United Nations vocabulary to designate a special category of participants in the U.N.
system .... The term is well known in the Western areas of Europe, as well as in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.").
224. See Anheier & Simmons, supra note 48, at 24.
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There are three principal problems with these efforts to conscript
funders into carrying out these investigatory functions: (1) the process
does not provide the transparency and fairness that typically
accompanies government processes; (2) nonprofit organizations,
especially smaller organizations, are not equipped to effectively carry
out investigatory functions; and (3) the process diminishes the
credibility of nonprofits operating abroad. The role thrust upon
nonprofits by the Treasury ATF Guidelines is not comparable to
those instances in which private entities choose to conduct certain
functions traditionally associated with the state;225 here nonprofits are
coerced into the role without corresponding benefit to themselves or
society.
As previously noted, most nonprofit entities feel compelled to
follow the Guidelines because of the catastrophic effects of having
their assets frozen if the government were to deem the organization
uncooperative. 26 This enlistment of private citizens (i.e., charitable
organizations) to gather information-essentially to undertake an
investigatory function-represents a partial shifting of traditional
governmental functions and responsibilities. Significantly, the
supplemental data that the Treasury ATF Guidelines ask nonprofits
to collect are not necessary or helpful to improve the quality of
grantmaking.227 In practice, most funders find that they can gather
enough information about the potential grantee, its leadership, its
track record, and its uses of funds without the additional steps and
information outlined in the Guidelines. As such, the information
gathering in accordance with the Treasury ATF Guidelines appears
to be for investigatory purposes on behalf of the government with the
burdens and expenses placed on the nonprofit sector. Moreover,
since the prescribed efforts generate no additional benefit for the
nonprofit sector and speculative benefit, at best, for society, the
government has not adequately justified the coercion of charitable
organizations. Such coercion is troubling: transferring a public
function to NGOs leads to a less transparent process, both to the
public as a whole and to the constituency under investigation, and as
225. For discussion of issues associated with voluntary public-private partnerships, see
MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
(2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285 (2003); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006).
226. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
227. See Strom, supra note 199 (quoting a philanthropic executive as saying, " 'It's
unclear how all this information [from the Treasury ATF Guidelines] would help us and
what it has to do with our grant-making' ").
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a result potentially makes it more difficult to hold the government
accountable. To the extent that potential grantee organizations
investigated would like to challenge the results, criticize the manner
of investigation, or even subject the process of the required
investigation to public scrutiny or inquiry, the government has
immunized itself from complaints regarding the ways such
investigations are handled by shifting responsibilities to private
charitable organizations doing work that more suitably falls under the
government's direct purview.
Assigning investigatory tasks to nonprofits is ill-conceived
because nonprofits are not likely to be well-equipped or effective
investigatory agents. The Guidelines place nonprofits in the position
of carrying out functions beyond those usually required to ensure the
efficacy of charitable uses of grant funds. The suggested "data
mining" tasks from the Guidelines fall outside the usual due diligence
measures and expertise of charitable organizations.22  Such
organizations cannot be viewed as agents of the U.S. government if
they are to effectively carry out their work. Several international
philanthropists have expressed concern that the information
collection activities will undermine the reputation of nonprofit
organizations "for impartiality and operational independence from
governments," which is a significant source of organizational strength
that permits nongovernmental organizations to operate effectively in
disaster areas and places of armed conflict.229 Extensive government
entanglement in ways that undermine independence may blur the
lines between legitimate NGOs and less-respected government-
organized NGOs ("GONGOs").23°
228. Although the Guidelines call for the collection of certain data and information on
foreign grantees, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 9-12, they do not
offer any direction or reveal how a grantmaking organization should analyze the data,
once received. So, effectively the Guidelines have imposed a burden of collecting data on
nonprofits without providing useful guidance on its uses.
229. See Grant Williams, Safe and Sound? Charities That Work Abroad Caution That
Antiterrorism Guidelines Could Hinder, Not Help, Their Efforts, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 7, 2003, at 8 (quoting a joint statement of InterAction and
Independent Sector on the Treasury ATF Guidelines).
230. Certain human rights-violating governments have created "nonprofit
organizations" that turn out to be GONGOs used to manipulate public opinion by
advocating on their government's behalf or defending their government at the United
Nations or other international conferences or events. See Lowenkron, Testimony Before
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 205 (noting Tunisian government intelligence
members attending conferences and monitoring individuals and China's use of GONGOs
at the United Nations); Melissa E. Crow, From Dyad to Triad: Reconceptualizing the
Lawyer-Client Relationship for Litigation in Regional Human Rights Commissions, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097, 1132-33 (2005) (discussing GONGOs).
[Vol. 85
INTERNATIONAL PHILANTHROPY
The programmatic effectiveness of international funders
depends, to a great extent, on relations with key stakeholders.
Grantmakers often find that "[s]takeholder interactions improve the
ability of foundations to achieve their missions in ways that help
people and communities., 231 However, some recommendations of the
Treasury ATF Guidelines seem to exacerbate tensions of cross-
border philanthropy and underestimate the potentially delicate
relationships at stake. For instance, the Guidelines direct grantors to
generate lists containing background information (names, nicknames,
nationality, citizenship, place and date of birth, residential
information, etc.) on staff and board members at foreign recipient
organizations.232 Requesting the type of information recommended,
however, could undermine relationships between grantors and
prospective grantees.233 In many parts of the world, "there appears to
be a pervasive lack of trust and confidence in nonprofit
organizations, '234 which may lead some U.S. grantmakers to be
viewed with greater suspicion; these invasive inquiries can support the
perception that the nonprofit is working on behalf of foreign or
domestic governments. And these fears may actually be warranted.
In fact, in some countries, seeking the background information
suggested may be misinterpreted as "intelligence-gathering" efforts
on behalf of hostile local government officials, and may actually place
organization staff at risk.235 In addition to harm by insurgents, many
foreign nonprofit employees around the world fear physical abuse at
the hands of their government if their affiliation with certain
humanitarian or pro-democracy NGOs were made public. For
instance, in recent congressional testimony, a senior U.S. State
Department official acknowledged unjust government harassment,
231. Thomas E. Backer et al., Who Comes to the Table? Stakeholder Interactions in
Philanthropy, in RETHINKING PHILANTHROPIC EFFECTIVENESS: LESSONS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF FOUNDATION EXPERTS, supra note 48, at 111, 111.
232. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 11.
233. See Strom, supra note 199 (quoting a nonprofit executive who explained that the
Treasury ATF Guidelines place U.S. charitable organizations " 'in the position of seeming
like police agents or spies' ").
234. Johnson et al., supra note 203, at 26-27.
235. See Council on Foundations Letter, supra note 167, at 15; see, e.g., Adrian
Blomfield, Aid Crisis as Charity Is Forced Out of Darfur, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Dec. 22, 2004, at 10 (noting the murders of humanitarian aid workers from the British
charity Save the Children in Sudan, the French charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors
Without Borders) in Afghanistan, and the American charity Iraq for Care in Iraq).
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beatings, and arrests of local NGO employees in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East. 36
Further, because of the unequal power dynamics in the funding
relationship and the perception of U.S. foundations as elitist, U.S.
grantors have been seeking to develop symbiotic partnership
relationships with their grant recipients.237 When they follow these
measures and request a written certification that the foreign
organization does not deal with terrorists or "support terrorism, 2 38
grantmakers may jeopardize the working relationship with their new
partners before it even begins. This issue is particularly sensitive in
dealings in certain parts of the world, such as the Middle East.
Moreover, obtaining certification regarding terrorist support is a
futile exercise because it is unlikely to deter a nefarious grantee
seeking to dupe a U.S. charitable organization into donating funds
that can be diverted to support terrorism.
Insofar as regulatory reforms interfere with grantor-grantee
relationships between U.S. funders and foreign recipient
organizations, charitable effectiveness may be undermined, thus
lessening the ability of nonprofit organizations to contribute to
America's soft power. Global nonprofits draw strength and influence
from their ability to "represent[] broad public interests beyond the
purview of individual states."'3 9 The credibility and trustworthiness
that nonprofits bring to communities are just as important, perhaps
even more important, to the long-term success of funded projects as
their funds and resources. 4 ° Much of that virtue is a function of their
independence from national governments. If they become an
extension of government or even perceived as such, nonprofits
forsake the high middle ground between the public and private
spheres.241 Paradoxically, much of the benefit that nonprofits confer
236. See Lowenkron, Testimony Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 205
(noting that the government in Uzbekistan has "harassed, beaten and jailed" nonprofit
workers and that "NGO employees have been convicted of criminal offenses for their
work making it virtually impossible for them to find other jobs" and describing similar
actions in Sudan and Syria).
237. See Backer et al., supra note 231, at 111 (noting that foundations are often
perceived by stakeholders as "elitist institutions"); id. at 117 (addressing power
differentials between grantor and grantee).
238. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 10.
239. NYE, supra note 13, at 90.
240. See Crimm, supra note 6, at 119.
241. See Anheier & Simmons, supra note 48, at 23-24 ("Foundations tend to be viewed
as 'apolitical' or more neutral organizations and can therefore engage local actors more
easily.... Thanks to their independence, foundations can serve as catalysts and bring all
types of groups together.").
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on government through the enhancement of soft power is dependent
on the theoretical and actual separation between private nonprofit
associations and official government entities. Security interests, it
would appear, are thus tied into the effectiveness and the
independence of charitable organizations.
C. Reducing and Skewing Direct Funding to Foreign Charities
Unfortunately, the federal government's current approach24 2 has
created incentives for U.S. philanthropic organizations to steer
"international-related" grants toward U.S.-based intermediary
organizations with operations abroad, instead of awarding grants
directly to foreign nonprofit organizations. The initial evidence
seems to indicate that shifts away from direct overseas giving are
continuing, in part because of the regulatory environment. Data from
the Foundation Center, which tracks trends in philanthropy, show
that the proportion of international grant dollars awarded directly
overseas versus given to U.S.-based intermediaries operating abroad
declined by nearly five percentage points between 1994 and 2002.243
Moreover, recent data covering the period between 2002 and 2004
revealed that total direct cross-border giving dollars by U.S.
foundations to foreign charities declined an additional 3% with the
actual raw number of such grants declining by 9% (compared to a 3%
decline in the number of grants to U.S.-based recipients). 2' The
downward trend data support findings from surveys of grantmakers
suggesting that the Executive Order and the PATRIOT Act were
partly responsible for the behavioral shifts causing funders to favor
U.S.-based intermediaries.245
The creation of incentives to funnel grants through U.S.
intermediaries is troubling because such a shift impacts not only the
nature of philanthropy but also U.S. security interests. Security
interests are implicated in two important ways. First, as compared to
indirect international grantmaking carried out by intermediaries or
U.S entities, direct grants to local foreign nonprofits offer advantages
with respect to institution-building and the development of civil
society. For instance, local foreign recipient organizations offer a
more sophisticated appreciation of local customs, a deep
understanding of local problems and networks, and a permanent staff
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 43.
244. See RENZ & AT1ENZA, supra note 9, at 4.
245. See RENZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 13, 15.
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committed to the region. In addition, local foreign organizations may
be better positioned to partner with local foreign governments to
maximize resources and strategic responses. As a result, direct
foreign grants help build the capacity of local, sustainable civil
organizations abroad, and evidence indicates that such institutions are
critical to the long-term success of development efforts.246 While U.S.
public charities conducting work abroad may serve local communities
in valuable and significant ways, when the actual work is done by U.S.
entities, rather than by a sustainable local organization, the nonprofit
does not make the same contributions to the creation of social capital
and civil society: teaching the skills of self-government, instilling the
values of tolerance and civility, and mediating the space between the
individual, government, and business. 247 This problem is magnified by
the fact that, when it comes to individual giving, U.S. tax laws already
offer strong incentives to U.S. citizens to favor U.S.-based charities
over foreign organizations by limiting tax deductions to donations
made to domestically organized charities.248  Accordingly, because
foreign NGOs have traditionally received much of their American
financial support from philanthropic organizations, rather than from
individuals, the new giving environment created by the federal
government has the effect of redirecting the flow of institutional
charitable funds away from foreign organizations, which can be
especially crippling.
Second, private foundations face increased incentives to support
international programs through U.S intermediaries (rather than
giving directly to the foreign charity). Ironically, such incentives may
actually lead to less due diligence with respect to foreign grant
recipients, thus undermining security interests. Consider this
hypothetical: A U.S. foundation seeks to donate $50,000 to combat
HIV in a remote township in South Africa. The foundation identifies
the sole nonprofit service provider working in the region as Ubuntu
HIV Relief, an entity organized under South African law and run by
native South African men and women. The foundation can choose to
make the $50,000 grant either directly to Ubuntu or through the
South African HIV/AIDS Fund, an intermediary organized under
U.S. law as a public charity headquartered in New York City that
246. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., U.S. FOREIGN AID: MEETING THE
CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 12 (2004), available at http://www.us
aid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf.
247. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 571-78 (1998).
248. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (c)(2)(A) (2000).
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raises funds in the United States and makes grants to deserving
organizations in South Africa, and would make a $44,000 contribution
to Ubuntu (using the remaining $6,000 to cover its general and
administrative expenses). Under current law, if a private foundation
makes grants directly to a foreign recipient organization, the
foundation must follow a comprehensive set of laws and regulations
requiring detailed due diligence, through the structured equivalency
determination or the expenditure responsibility process . 49 However,
if those same grant contributions are shifted to U.S. intermediaries,
which are invariably public charities, the monies flowing overseas
become subject to the less rigorous due diligence standards for U.S.
public charities because the stricter foundation requirements do not
apply.25 0 To the extent that the foundation is concerned about the
regulatory environment, it has incentives to resist direct giving to
Ubuntu, with the effect that the amount of overall due diligence
conducted on the foreign recipient might actually decrease (because
the U.S. intermediaries receiving funds would be public charities),
and fewer charitable dollars would actually reach the developing
world, thus limiting the potential benefits.
D. Undermining American Values
If our national security interests rest, even in part, on "halt[ing]
the creation of new terrorists by dealing, to the extent possible, with
those grievances that are driving radicalization ' 251 or on winning the
struggle for the "hearts and minds" of peoples around the world
through attraction to shared values, vision, and principles, or on both,
we must consider the consequences of adopting policies that
undermine our efforts to achieve those goals. The U.S. government's
current approach to international philanthropy undermines long-term
American interests, specifically its interests in enhancing public
diplomacy and soft power, in several important ways.
The attraction that forms the basis for soft power is greatly
influenced by a variety of factors, including the perception of the
values for which the United States stands.252 An image is shaped by
249. See supra Part II.B.3.
250. See supra Part II.B.2. However, public charities as a matter of best practice in the
field maintain diligence procedures designed to ensure that funds are only used for
legitimate and charitable purposes. See EDIE & NOBER, supra note 110, at 20-21.
251. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF
THE WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 197 (2005).
252. See NYE, supra note 87, at 9 ("Soft power arises in large part from our values.
These values are expressed... in the policies we follow inside our country.
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more than just official press statements and media sound bites.
Treatment of U.S. citizens, especially Arab-Americans, affects global
perceptions of whether or not the United States lives up to the values
it espouses. With respect to international philanthropy, all U.S.
nonprofits are burdened by the new regulatory enforcement regime,
but none more so than Muslim organizations.253 This disparate
impact raises deep concerns about civil liberties and abuses of power.
More than just soured relations and public image are at stake;
the government's approach also implicates the civil liberties of
Muslim citizens and those who donate to charities committed to
serving Islamic communities around the world. The changes in the
law-especially the PATRIOT Act and the Executive Order-have
permitted federal authorities to close large U.S.-based Muslim
charities with minimal evidence and minimal attention to due
process.254 The evidence is not strong enough to support criminal
convictions but suggests guilt by association. Additionally, the
process is a secret one with limited court review,"' and the accused
nonprofit is denied access to much of the evidence used against it. As
Professor Peter Shane notes, this type of governmental power,
particularly when used against a specific targeted group, "strain[s]
against the norms of openness and transparency on which democratic
legitimacy is based." '256 This kind of governmental action reinforces
the Muslim community's perception of ethnic profiling257 and signals a
willingness to saddle Arab-Americans and their supporters with the
burdens of a "racial tax."25 Thus, we have a variety of important
253. See supra Part II.B.4.
254. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
255. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the standard of review for the courts is
quite limited. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Accordingly, the charities with their assets
frozen have turned to the courts but have failed to prevail not because the courts have
made determinations that these entities were terrorist fronts, but rather because the courts
could not determine that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious. As such, the
courts did not conduct their own factfinding. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v.
Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2005); Holy Land Found. for
Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218
(2004).
256. Shane, supra note 211 (manuscript at 4) (referencing secret government
programs).
257. See, e.g., OMB WATCH, MUSLIM CHARITIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR 5
(2006), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/pdfs/muslim-charities.pdf; AI-Marayati,
supra note 183, at 328-29.
258. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 138-63 (1997) (arguing
that profiling imposes a "racial tax"); see also JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA
AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-18
(1997) (describing a "Black tax" faced by African Americans due to racial stereotypes);
Robert S. Chang, Closing Essay: Developing a Collective Memory To Imagine a Better
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values at stake worthy of consideration on their own merits. The
negative impacts on public diplomacy and soft power also expand the
costs beyond those borne solely by Muslim charities and their
supporters to costs for U.S. security priorities.
IV. FROM COERCION TO COOPERATION: AVENUES FOR A NEW
REGULATORY REGIME
Once we recognize and acknowledge the valuable contributions
of international philanthropy to our security interests, we can begin to
develop a more complete picture of the security costs (not just the
administrative burdens) and tradeoffs associated with the current
regulatory approach. Doing so could lead to a shift in how nonprofits
are viewed in the global fight against terror. Instead of being seen as
weak links in the security chain, they should be considered front line
allies. In a complex world, the U.S. government should adopt policies
that take account of the security costs associated with regulating
international philanthropy and the importance of building soft power,
encouraging public diplomacy, and reducing terrorism and its root
causes. Terrorism remains a dangerous threat, but also a multifaceted
one that must be addressed on multiple fronts. The Bush
administration's focus on the prevention of further attacks is
understandable, but foreign assistance is also part of the solution. As
legal scholar and terrorism expert Professor Philip Heymann notes,
"We have to maintain our foreign alliances, formal and informal." '259
International aid, through the U.S. government and through private
institutions, contributes to those important relations.
A variety of potential avenues for reform might open if U.S.
policy began to reflect the security-enhancing value that U.S.
nonprofit organizations offer. Although the federal government and
the nonprofit sector should certainly work in collaboration to prevent
charitable funds from reaching terrorists, the response fashioned
should be commensurate with the risks and reflect the new cost-
benefit analysis advocated in this Article. Some potential policy
changes might include the following.
A. Subjecting Policies to Cost-Benefit Analysis
Since the Reagan administration, the executive branch of the
federal government has required a formal assessment of the costs and
Future, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1609 (2002) (stating that the detention and questioning of
thousands of men of Middle Eastern ancestry constitutes a "racial tax").
259. HEYMANN, supra note 61, at 14.
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benefits of major regulation. 6 °  By issuing the Treasury ATF
Guidelines as voluntary recommendations, these unofficial
regulations have avoided the typical cost-benefit scrutiny required of
significant regulatory action. Such avoidance is particularly ironic
due to the fact that the George W. Bush administration has been a
vocal proponent of using cost-benefit analysis to justify regulatory
action. 61  At a minimum, given the impact the Guidelines have on
behavior, it seems unjustified, if not hypocritical,262 to avoid this
important analysis when the charitable sector is affected rather than
business. Since the entire thrust of the cost-benefit balancing process
aims to minimize net social costs, the avoidance of such an analysis in
this case seems to conflict with the dominant grain of administrative
law governance.
Accordingly, private foundations and public charities should
advocate for a formal cost-benefit review of the Guidelines. The
introduction to the revised version of the Guidelines presents a thin
veneer of consideration of costs and benefits by at least
acknowledging "the vital importance of the charitable community in
providing essential services around the world. 2 63  However, this
approach is far too superficial and in many ways seems merely
symbolic without any elaboration of the actual stakes. In particular, it
260. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
261. See John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Remarks Delivered at the Brookings-
AEI Conference on "Risk, Science, and Public Policy: Setting Social and Environmental
Priorities" (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/speeches/101204-
risk.html ("I believe President Bush's first term, when studied by historians, will be
considered a period of refinement and reinforcement of the cost-benefit perspective. At
OMB ... [we] have reaffirmed the important cost-benefit principles ...."); Cindy
Skrzycki, Future of Federal Rulemaking Caught Up in Election, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004,
at El ("It is widely understood that the Bush administration thinks federal regulation
should play a limited role in the economy and that costs and benefits of a rule are carefully
considered. A chief proponent of that philosophy is John D. Graham .... [who] has
instituted strict guidelines for reviewing the costs and benefits of proposed rules, has sent
rules back to agencies for more justification, and has allowed third parties to challenge the
data behind rules.").
262. Critics charge that cost-benefit analysis has been primarily deployed as an anti-
regulatory tool to advance business interests. See, e.g., ROBERT PERKS ET AL.,
REWRITING THE RULES: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 24 (2002); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (2006) (contending that cost-benefit analysis "has almost
always proven anti-environmental in practice.... [Cost-benefit analysis] favors industry
..... ); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175,
179 (2003) ("Opponents of environmental regulation have been the principal proponents
of cost-benefit analysis ....").
263. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 3.
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fails to account for the critical role of nonprofit organizations in
building alliances around the world and generating soft power and
other benefits for the U.S. government. Specifically, it would be in
the nonprofit sector's interests to insist upon a review that includes
consideration of the security benefits, administrative costs borne by
charitable organizations, and security costs of the Guidelines. The
philanthropic community has gained some traction in its efforts to
convince the federal government to make at least cosmetic revisions
to the Guidelines addressing some administrative elements and
including references to understanding the complexities of charitable
work overseas. However, there has been no indication that a larger
shift of the type I call for is underway to account for the security
interests and social benefits implicated by the interplay between
public diplomacy, soft power, and international philanthropy.
Clearly, such an analysis of the costs and benefits would require
an assessment of more than just the quantified costs and the
quantified benefits." The intangible burdens and the broader social
impacts also need to be adequately and seriously considered.265 A
formal and thorough cost-benefit review might be especially helpful
in this instance because "[t]o the extent that people's emotions are
getting the better of them, by producing massive concern about small
risks, cost-benefit analysis should help put things in perspective, and
at the same time might help to calm popular fears." '266
B. Revisiting Post-September 11 Reforms
Although they were revised in December 2005 and again in
September 2006 to address some of the concerns raised by the
philanthropic community,267 the Treasury ATF Guidelines continue
264. When reviews are formally conducted by the Office of Management and Budget,
agency analysts are instructed to at least consider "non-quantified benefits or costs ... in
the context of the overall analysis." See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY
ANALYSIS, CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003).
265. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489,
1498 (2002) ("[C]ost-benefit analysis requires a full accounting of the consequences of an
action, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.").
266. Id. at 1502.
267. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 2. For example, the 2005
revised version of the Guidelines suggested organizational records and minutes should be
made available to any government authority upon request. See 2005 REVISED ANTI-
TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES, supra note 165, at 4. Several commentators,
including this author, have noted that in failing to at least acknowledge traditional due
process safeguards designed to protect civil liberties (e.g., warrant requirements and
subpoenas) the Guidelines might have been read as an attempt to ease the process
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to constrain and stifle international grantmaking activity.
Consequently, as we weigh the speculative security benefits against
the administrative and security costs, the Treasury Department might
heed the nonprofit community's call for the retraction of the
Guidelines.268 Simply put, international philanthropy is just too
important to be chilled by a set of measures based on untested
assumptions.
Too many of the "best practices" suggested by the Guidelines are
unworkable and unlikely to prevent the diversion of charitable
contributions. In some cases, following the Guidelines may pose
safety risks to international aid workers abroad2 69 or undermine the
effectiveness of nonprofits altogether. Although well-intentioned, the
Treasury ATF Guidelines exact security costs while providing only
speculative benefits. As I have argued, the nonprofit sector's
independence from government, its ability to work and contribute
effectively to global, social, and political development, and its
contributions to U.S. soft power and public diplomacy are too
important to be diluted without due cause. Further, the guideline
approach in this area is too likely to become de facto compulsory in
light of the regulatory environment. In light of the subtle yet
important security complexities at work, the Guidelines and their
emphasis on indiscriminate data collection take on a different and
costly character that may make them less relevant and worthwhile.
Additionally, the terms of the IEEPA and the Executive Order
should be revisited to place limitations on the length of time assets
may be frozen. Several million dollars of charitable assets earmarked
for the Muslim world have been held by the government. Even if the
government determines that freezing assets is required to prevent
imminent transfer while an investigation is ongoing, such a freeze
need not and should not be indefinite. In all five of the cases
involving U.S. public charities accused of terrorist connections, the
burdens associated with procedural due process for the Treasury Department and law
enforcement agencies seeking the information collected by the private funders. I have
argued that this previous impression drawn from the language and the pressure nonprofits
feel to comply with the Guidelines seemed to provide the government with information
and cooperation through coercion under the guise of voluntary language and promoting
"best practices," placing the perception of nonprofit independence from government at
risk. The 2006 modification to the Guidelines calls for such cooperation with the
government "[wihen served with process or when other appropriate authorization exists."
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 5.
268. See Caroline Preston, Charity Coalition Urges Government To Scrap Antiterrorism
Guidelines, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 9, 2006, at 38.
269. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
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nonprofits received donations with the expectation that the funds
contributed would be used to serve charitable purposes, primarily in
the Islamic world. 20 The U.S. government should ensure that those
funds ultimately are used for such purposes. After a reasonable
period of investigation, perhaps three years, funds should be released
so that they may reach the charitable stream as intended by the
original donors.
C. Reconsidering the Restrictions of Equivalency Determination
Acknowledging the many benefits of international philanthropy
and the ways in which it can enhance our national strategic interests
may lead the U.S. government to do more than simply roll back
regulation. Indeed, such a shift may lead to reconsideration of
existing tax laws to affirmatively facilitate and encourage
international philanthropy. Proactive changes to current tax laws
governing philanthropy can promote overseas giving without placing
our security at risk. Most notably, the requirements for equivalency
determination should be liberalized to remove impediments affecting
the ability of U.S. private foundations to support foreign
organizations.
Many of the Internal Revenue Code rules that apply to the
determination of a foreign NGO's equivalency status are both
unnecessarily formalistic and fail to consider the effects of promoting
charity abroad. For instance, nonprofit law scholar Nina Crimm has
argued that the requirements constraining nonprofit lobbying reflect
domestic concerns and considerations unrelated to foreign nonprofits,
alternative political cultures, and contemporary policy goals.271  To
advance certain articulated U.S. government policy objectives such as
the promotion of democratization efforts abroad, she calls for a
liberalization of the lobbying restriction as applied to U.S.
grantmakers supporting foreign organizations.272
I support Professor Crimm's proposal and would further suggest
additional reforms that broaden acceptable standards of equivalency
to facilitate international grantmaking. Ultimately, I would advocate
overhauling the equivalency determination process to permit
inclusion of foreign entities that are "comparable" to their public
270. For discussion of the cases, see supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
271. See Nina J. Crimm, Democratization, "Global Grant-Making, and the Internal
Revenue Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79 TUL. L. REV. 587, 599 (2005) ("[E]xisting
[Internal Revenue Code] lobbying restrictions ... were developed with only domestic
considerations in mind . .
272. Id. at 655.
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charity counterparts in the United States, rather than requiring that
the foreign entity be an identical clone. While certain key aspects of
what it means to be a public charity should be respected by all
nonprofit organizations and equivalents, regardless of their country of
origin (e.g., the nondistribution constraint273 and the purpose
requirement274), other elements of the test should be relaxed. If
another country makes different policy choices regarding the ability
of their charitable organizations to express political opinions or
regarding the specific percentage cutoffs for different types of support
to be generated from the public, those choices should be respected to
permit a broader conceptualization of equivalency. For instance, in
addition to removing the lobbying restrictions with respect to foreign
organizations, I would also provide more flexibility with regard to the
political campaign ban 275 and the public support test.276 Although the
limitations on political campaign intervention and the calculations of
levels of public support may make sense for the regulation of
domestic charities, they hardly seem to reach the core values defining
nonprofit status, but rather reflect policy judgments used to define
and police the parameters of the domestic nonprofit sector.
Importantly, liberalization in these areas would not seem to pose
any risks that terrorists could more easily dupe U.S. funders into
supporting their efforts. Even under my proposal, the level of due
diligence and the process related to "getting to know the grantee"
would not change even if some of the legal standards were relaxed,
and it is through this process that U.S. funders become familiar with
273. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838-40 (1980) (noting that the "nondistribution constraint," which prohibits the
distribution of net earnings and other forms of private benefit from nonprofit activity, is
the defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization); James J. Fishman, Improving
Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 225 (2003) (stating that the nondistribution
constraint is the fundamental distinction between a charitable nonprofit and a business
corporation).
274. Section 501(c)(3) exempts only organizations "organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
275. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are barred from "participat[ing] in, or
interven[ing] in... any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office." Id.
276. A grantee other than a church, hospital, or educational institution must show that
it meets the public support test, one or more of a series of tests to prove that an
organization is entitled to public charity status (rather than private foundation status). See
I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 509(a)(2). The tests are based on mathematical formulas
combined with subjective factors requiring detailed analysis of financial information based
on a rolling four-year formula. See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3 (as amended in 2002).
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foreign grantee recipients and their activities to assess their
legitimacy. Accordingly, adjusting Internal Revenue Code
restrictions could expand international philanthropy and magnify its
positive effects. While a fuller analysis and the details of such a
reform to the tax code and the equivalency determination rules are
beyond the scope of this Article, the very idea of the reform reveals
new possibilities and policy shifts that could flow from a more robust
recognition of the benefits of international philanthropy and its
contributions to soft power. Policy decisions motivated by an interest
in using international philanthropy to produce soft power would
provoke different reforms to federal law.
D. Adopting Safe Harbors and Mechanisms for Multinational
Signaling of Legitimate NGOs
To the extent that the government's cost-benefit analysis
determines a need to further regulate cross-border giving beyond
existing tax law, it should pursue a different strategy reflecting
recognition of the security benefits nonprofits and international
grantmaking provide. The U.S. government's current approach,
which coerces private funders into conducting their own
investigations and relies on a "black list" of potential terrorists,
neither enlists the cooperation of multinational partners nor leverages
the benefits of collective research. Instead, the government could
adopt a different approach creating safe harbors for private
foundations and public charities funding activities abroad. The
detailed basis for the safe harbor could take a variety of forms, but
the real benefit would be to provide a formal mechanism offering
incentives to funders to follow certain procedures and ensuring that
assets would not be seized or frozen, nor individuals criminally
prosecuted, if they followed the procedures. 77 Such an approach
would treat nonprofits as allies and engender their cooperation.
A safe harbor could be either "funder-focused," dependent on
the funder's grantmaking process meeting prescribed procedures, or
"grant recipient-focused," dependent on the actual destination of the
charitable funds. For instance, consider a system structured
according to the first method. The safe harbor could be centered on a
process-oriented set of standards to be followed by funders (e.g., a
277. See Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal To Improve the Community
Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 375 (1993) (stating that safe harbors may be
particularly attractive under circumstances when entities encounter uncertain standards or
are especially risk-adverse).
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modified and more practical version of the Guidelines or some other
set of explicit standards designed to regulate due diligence concerning
foreign grants). Private funders choosing to follow the procedures
established by the safe harbor would have the confidence and peace
of mind that they could engage in international philanthropic activity
without fear or risk of adverse government action against them. Such
a system could achieve the purpose of preventing potential diversion
of charitable funds while still encouraging international grantmaking,
especially funding activity in the developing world, the Middle East,
and other high-risk places where the aid may be most needed.
Alternatively, another option for structuring a safe harbor could
focus on grant recipients themselves. Specifically, an authorized
governmental body would spearhead an effort to create a pre-cleared
list of NGOs (a "white list"), certified after review of a foreign
recipient organization's compliance systems, financial controls and
relations, and other pertinent practices sufficient to determine the
legitimacy of the charitable entity.
The benefits of such a white list would be numerous. First, the
investigatory work examining an organization's finances, leadership,
and organizational links could be conducted by trained professionals
with substantial expertise rather than by the untrained staff of U.S.
nonprofits. Second, such a system would save each potential funder
from incurring the costs in staff time and resources associated with
conducting its own review, thereby providing shared cost savings
across the sector. Similarly, this would minimize the burdens on
foreign charities by requiring one review and all of its associated
requests, as opposed to dealing with multiple equivalency
determination and expenditure responsibility demands. Third,
inclusion on such a white list would provide the foreign NGO a
reputational benefit by offering a positive signal to potential
grantmakers, as opposed to the current system that in effect
encourages funders to treat all foreign nonprofits as terrorist fronts
until proven otherwise.
Such an affirmative certification of charities would, of course,
also pose risks. A primary concern would be that the system might be
used for political purposes. One could imagine that a charitable
organization might be denied certification unjustly because of its
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political stances or influence. Of course, the current use of a black list
system is equally subject to political influences and similar abuses.278
More important, the use of a grant recipient-based safe harbor
raises the question of which government authority would be
responsible for creating and maintaining the white list. The U.S.
government might well desire to maintain control of such a process.
However, if the decisions were made in cooperation with other
governments through a multilateral process, we might avoid the
specter of politicized decisionmaking, as compared with the current
system under which the U.S. Secretary of State makes such
determinations.279 If a multilateral approach were developed, through
either the United Nations or some other collaboration, sufficient staff
personnel and resources to efficiently administer such a system would
need to be devoted to the project.280 However, under the white list
proposal, charitable organizations in multiple countries engaged in
overseas giving, various U.N. and governmental agencies, and other
multilateral funders could benefit from the collective vetting of
organizations that would take place.
Finally, there is a concern that negative inferences might be
drawn about entities that have not yet been vetted for inclusion on
such a white list or that some small organizations would actually
prefer not to be included on such a list, out of fear that inclusion may
create a stigma or make them a target of their home government. In
many respects, for a foreign organization to be on an approved U.N.
or multilateral list may be less stigmatizing than to be on a list created
solely by the United States. While an implicit black list may emerge,
there are benefits associated with a shift toward a system with a
positive legal consequence (i.e., a safe harbor for grantmakers) that
still maintains the flexibility to make grants to those not on the list,
after ample due diligence and a weighing of risks. If adopted, such a
system could meet the U.S. government's goal of ensuring more
aggressive reviews of foreign charitable organizations, but it could
also permit U.S. funders to do what they do best-make grants to
278. See Lowenkron, Testimony Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 205
(noting that some governments "resort to extralegal forms of intimidation or persecution
[against nonprofits] .... justify[ing] their actions by accusations of ... terrorism").
279. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
280. However, it is worth noting that the U.N. already devotes resources to create and
maintain its own terrorism watch list, which has received the endorsement of the U.S.
government. See Memorandum from Mara T. Patermaster, Dir., Office of CFC
Operations, to Local Fed. Coordinating Comms. et al. (Nov. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2004/2004-12.asp ("Although not required, OPM
continues to encourage [charitable] organizations to consult the United Nations list.").
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worthwhile organizations meeting their philanthropic goals, such as
working to alleviate poverty, protect the environment, and provide
relief.
Regardless of whether the safe harbor is funder-focused
(emphasizing pre-grant due diligence) or grant recipient-focused
(emphasizing a white list), a shift to a safe harbor approach would
eliminate much of the uncertainty and angst grantmakers currently
face and thereby encourage private foundations and public charities
to actively engage in international philanthropic activity to the
maximum level each funder seeks.
CONCLUSION
Writing about the legal and policy environments post-September
11, one legal scholar has eloquently noted that "[w]e live in a time of
expanded possibilities and expanded fears.""28  More than five years
after those devastating attacks, countering terrorism remains the
nation's top national security concern. But, if time has taught us
anything, it is that the threats posed by terrorism have challenged the
United States to pursue a strategic, comprehensive, long-term
campaign to protect our country and share our values with the world.
With respect to international philanthropy, rather than meeting those
challenges, our policies seem to be governed by fears. After
September 11, government policymakers focused on measures they
intuited would support the war on terrorism, yet the ramifications of
the antiterrorist financing campaign for charities and the
accompanying cost-benefit analysis may not support their
intuitions.282
Since September 11, U.S.-based international funders have
become at best collateral damage and at worst targets in the
government's campaign against terrorist financing. The terms of the
debate and the thinking about nonprofits need to be revised. The
perception that the regulation of international grantmaking pits
security benefits against administrative costs misframes the stakes.
Federal measures affecting international philanthropy entail security
costs as well. U.S. public charities and private foundations working
abroad should be viewed as essential, strategic allies in the effort to
enhance the United States's global influence and strength and as such
should be encouraged by both rhetoric and policy.
281. Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. GRIM. L. 45, 101 (2003).
282. Cf Mitchell, supra note 12, at 222-24 (making this point in the context of
examining anti-money laundering laws post September 11).
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Although only a small fraction of foreign grants might be at risk
of diversion to the support of terrorism,283 the current federal
government approach burdens all international grants. Undoubtedly,
grantmakers and grant recipients active where U.S. charitable support
is most needed-in the developing world of Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East-are most affected. Philanthropy helps promote
political and economic development and addresses the root causes of
terrorism so that it can ultimately be defeated. Moreover, American
NGOs are important and powerful actors and critical image
influencers around the world, and initiatives that undermine their
work and their independence exact security costs; policymakers must
account for those costs as we consider the tradeoffs associated with
greater regulation. The current regulatory treatment of U.S. funders
discourages international giving, leading to a more isolationist
philanthropic policy.
While the U.S. government has been focused on its hard power
in recent years, its soft power has waned, and other countries are
taking notice. In fact, the European Union, China, and even Islamic
countries in the Middle East are seeking to attract converts to their
values. For instance, the European Union has pooled its economic
power to compete with the United States, and the EU's success in
commerce, public diplomacy, and progressive social and political
models is increasing its attractiveness. 284  In addition, China has
achieved success in strengthening its own soft power, particularly in
Asia, presenting its own political values and culture while investing in
283. Again, the lack of documented evidence of U.S. entities making charitable
contributions to terrorist fronts seems to indicate that legitimate U.S. funders using
standard diligence practices have not been unwitting sources for terrorist funding.
Although any diversion is to be avoided, due to the average size of grants and the level of
resources potentially raised from diversion from unwitting donors, it seems that legitimate
U.S. charitable grants would be unlikely to generate substantial resources for terrorist
organizations because of the small scale and sustainability of financing. See, e.g.,
Nominations of John 0. Colvin, Stuart Levey, and Juan C. Zarate: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, supra note 173, at 21 (statement of Sen. Bob Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on Finance) ("[In discussing] terrorist financing, there is almost an inevitable
gravitational pull to start talking about charities .... but that is not where I see the real
problem.... [T]he real problem is when governments ... are providing the financial
assistance."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-163, TERRORIST FINANCING:
U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE OF ALTERNATIVE
FINANCING MECHANISMS 9-12 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04163.pdf (noting that other sources of terrorist funding include trading in illicit drugs,
weapons, cigarettes, and diamonds).
284. See Marc Champion, EU Tries Again on Foreign Policy: Reinvigorated Drive for
Unified Action Draws Notice in Washington, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at A14.
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public diplomacy and development aid.285 What does this mean for
the United States? Europe and China will not push aside the United
States, but their success underscores the point that soft power should
not be ignored. A decline of soft power means the U.S. government
loses persuasive powers, places itself in a weaker bargaining position
with allies, and engenders less international cooperation. 6
The 9/11 Commission highlighted the central role of U.S. foreign
aid and public diplomacy in the long-term success of the fight against
terrorism.2 87  Accordingly, the federal government should adopt
policies and develop an approach that marshal the expansive
resources of the nonprofit sector to its side. International
philanthropy is an important piece of the puzzle, and the United
States should devote resources and develop policies to produce soft
power. Public diplomacy, soft power, and concern for democratic
institutions and human rights abroad are not peripheral, na've, or
insubstantial distractions. U.S. military strength is unsurpassed, and
we have not been afraid to use it; our philanthropic strength is equally
remarkable, and we should not be afraid to use it to even greater
ends. We should not injure our own long-term security interests, or
the interests of our friends, by overreacting to the fear of aiding our
enemies.
285. See Kurlantzick, supra note 68, at 422-23 ("China has emerged as a potential rival
to American soft power as ... Beijing begins to enunciate its values and market its
institutions and culture. To their Asian neighbors, Chinese officials ... support[] a
multipolar world in which nations do not aggressively interfere in other nations' affairs....
Public sentiment across Asia has become more favorable toward China.... ").
286. Hard power alone does not always achieve desired results. Even a dictator must
balance hard and soft power. Cooperation matters because, as Joseph Nye writes, "[o]ther
countries' governments are quite often better placed to identify and arrest terrorists.
Their cooperation is essential, and obtaining it will depend on both our hard and soft
power." NYE, supra note 87, at 164.
287. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 363-64 (finding that U.S. success
against terrorism "demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy,
intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public
diplomacy, and homeland defense").
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